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ABSTRACT—The last sixty years have ushered in a tectonic shift in 
American sexual culture, from the sexual revolution—with its liberal 
attitudes toward sex and sexuality—to a growing recognition of rape culture 
and sexual harassment. The responses to these changes in sexual culture have 
varied. Conservatives, for their part, bemoan the liberalization of sexual 
mores and the rise of a culture where “anything goes.” And while 
progressives may cheer the liberalization of attitudes toward sex and 
sexuality and the growing recognition of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault, they lament the inadequacy of state efforts to combat sexual 
violence. Although these responses are substantively different, both evince 
a sense of the state’s failure. For conservatives, the changes wrought by the 
decriminalization of “deviant” sexual behavior, the shift to no-fault divorce 
regimes, and the recognition of constitutional protections for sex and 
sexuality suggest that the state has abdicated its historic role in imposing 
consequences on those who do not comply with traditional sexual mores. For 
progressives (and especially feminists), state efforts to properly regulate 
rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment are, at best, anemic and, at worst, 
utterly ineffectual. As they see it, the state has failed to impose consequences 
for harassment, assault, and other offensive sexual conduct. 
But it is not just that these two constituencies believe that the state has 
failed to properly regulate sex and sexuality; they have also responded in 
uncannily similar ways to these lapses. Specifically, in response to the state’s 
failure to regulate, private actors on both sides of the ideological spectrum 
have stepped into the regulatory void, challenging extant sexual norms and 
articulating new visions of appropriate sex and sexuality. These private 
regulatory efforts are evident in the rise and proliferation of conscience 
objections or exemptions, as exemplified in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, as well as in the emergence of the 
#MeToo movement. As this Article maintains, conscience objections allow 
private actors to reject the extant normative regime and instead articulate and 
enforce their own views of appropriate sex and sexuality through the denial 
of goods and services. The #MeToo movement has similarly sought to 
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advance an alternative vision of appropriate sex and sexuality through 
private action. Using social media and the press, the #MeToo movement has 
identified recidivist harassers and workplaces where sexual harassment and 
sexual assault are rife, advocated for increased workplace harassment 
training, and, ultimately, called for the expulsion from the workplace of 
many high-profile men who, for years, engaged in objectionable conduct. 
As this Article explains, the fact that private actors are stepping in to 
regulate in the state’s stead is not necessarily novel. Private actors have often 
played a regulatory role—particularly in contexts where norms are in flux or 
contested. Nevertheless, the private regulation seen in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and #MeToo evinces a new turn in the regulation of sex and 
sexuality. In the absence of appropriate state regulation of sex and sexuality, 
private actors are coming to the fore to take on a more visible role in 
regulating sex and sexuality, and in doing so, have claimed and recast parts 
of the public sphere as private space suitable for the imposition of their own 
norms and values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last sixty years, there has been a tectonic shift in American 
sexual culture. The combination of decriminalization, shifting social mores, 
and the recognition of constitutional privacy protections has given rise to 
what some have termed a “sexual revolution.”1 Whether one agrees that what 
has taken place is in fact revolutionary, it is undeniable that over this time, 
there has been a profound liberalization of the attitudes and laws governing 
sex and sexuality. Sex is no longer confined to marriage. Indeed, most 
individuals routinely engage in sex without the benefit of a marriage license,2 
frequently cohabiting with partners regardless of marital status. On many 
college campuses, “hook up” culture flourishes, allowing individuals 
 
 1 Michael Compitello, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in the Battle Against 
Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 159 (1997) (discussing the connection between the “sexual 
revolution” and the rise of privacy protections). 
 2 Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954–2003, 122 PUB. HEALTH 
REP. 73, 73–78 (2007) (discussing survey findings from 2002 revealing that, by age twenty, seventy-five 
percent of Americans had had premarital sex). 
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opportunities for sexual experimentation.3 Courts have recognized 
constitutional rights to contraception4 and abortion,5 providing women 
greater reproductive autonomy. And perhaps most profoundly, LGBTQ 
individuals are no longer consigned by law to the shadows of the closet. They 
are legally free to express their sexual orientation and, more recently, are 
entitled to have their relationships recognized by the state in civil marriage.6 
But the changes in sexual culture are not limited to the liberalization 
impulses of the “sexual revolution.” We have also witnessed profound 
changes in the way we conceive of and address rape, sexual assault, and 
sexual harassment. In many jurisdictions, the marital rape exemption, which 
ruled out the prospect of rape within the course of an intact marriage, has 
been jettisoned.7 Rape shield laws attempt to facilitate the prosecution and 
enforcement of rape laws by prohibiting the publication of a rape 
complainant’s identity and by limiting a defendant’s ability to introduce 
evidence of, or cross-examine rape complainants about, their past sexual 
behavior.8 Likewise, policies and regulations prohibiting sexual harassment 
have been introduced in public and private workplaces,9 complementing 
statutory prohibitions on the same conduct at both the state and federal 
levels.10 
 
 3 For a cogent discussion of “hook up” culture and its effects, see generally KATHLEEN A. BOGLE, 
HOOKING UP: SEX, DATING, AND RELATIONSHIPS ON CAMPUS (2008); see also Mary D. Fan, Sex, 
Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 538–43 (2011) 
(noting how shifting social mores regarding sexuality dramatically impact young individuals, like college 
students, because they tend to be the most sexually active). 
 4 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the right to contraception to all 
individuals, whether married or single); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (striking 
state law prohibiting contraception even to married couples on the grounds of the marital right to privacy). 
 5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (striking as unconstitutional state law outlawing abortion). 
 6 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (finding state law prohibiting same-sex 
marriage unconstitutional). 
 7 But see Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1373, 1375 (2000) (noting that, despite reforms, many states retained the exemption in some form 
or created procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions). 
 8 FED. R. EVID. 412; id. 413. Efforts to improve the enforcement of rape laws and protect victims 
culminated in the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which declared evidence of a victim’s past 
sexual behavior generally inadmissible in criminal or civil proceedings, and its companion, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 413, which allows the government to admit evidence at trial of the defendant’s history of 
sexual assault. For further discussion of the passage of Rules 412 and 413, see I. Bennett Capers, Real 
Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 843–46 (2013). 
 9 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462–63 (2001) (discussing how multiple players, including private, public, and 
nongovernmental actors, have developed or redesigned mechanisms to address sexual harassment and 
other equity concerns). 
 10 For a discussion of the development of federal statutory protections against sexual harassment 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 
816–26 (1991). For a discussion of how federal civil rights law compares to more progressive statutory 
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These various changes have produced a range of responses. For many, 
the liberalization of adult consensual sex has been well-received—a 
welcome shift toward greater autonomy and liberty in intimate life.11 For 
others, however, the sexual revolution has heralded a steady slide into sexual 
libertinism and, indeed, an embrace of a culture of “sex without 
consequences.”12 As these dissenters see it, the legalization of abortion and 
contraception has diminished “the sacredness of sexual intercourse, and its 
intrinsic connection with the procreating of new, vulnerable, human life.”13 
At the same time, the emergence and proliferation of no-fault divorce 
regimes have, it is claimed, diminished the importance of marriage and 
ushered in an era of “divorce on demand.”14 Whereas the state, often—
though not exclusively—through the operation of criminal law, once 
imposed harsh consequences for exploring sex and sexuality outside of the 
narrow confines of heterosexual marriage,15 these voices argue that there is 
no one imposing such consequences in today’s liberalized sexual society.16 
 
prohibitions on harassment at the state level, see Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: 
Looking to California as a Model, 128 YALE L.J.F. 121, 126–28 (2018). 
 11 See Jean M. Twenge et al., Changes in American Adults’ Sexual Behavior and Attitudes, 1972–
2012, 44 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 2273, 2277 (2015) (finding that “[b]etween the 1970s and the 2010s, 
American adults became more accepting of premarital sex, adolescent sex, and same-sex sexual activity, 
but less accepting of extramarital sex”); see also Melissa Murray, Griswold’s Criminal Law, 47 CONN. 
L. REV. 1045, 1072 (2015) (“Griswold is credited with helping to transform society from one in which 
the state demanded compliance with majoritarian sexual norms to one in which the state respected some 
degree of sexual autonomy.”). 
 12 See Jonathan Pokluda, America’s Greatest “Right”: Sex Without Consequences, PORCH (Apr. 6, 
2015), http://www.theporch.live/blogs/sex-without-consequences [https://perma.cc/3AWT-MDY5] 
(arguing that those who attempt to hinder or limit these emerging sexual rights are often publicly vilified 
for expressing those views). Importantly, the notion of consequence-free sex was also articulated by 
feminists in support of increased reproductive rights. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 98 (1987) (“[T]he [reproductive] equality issue has been 
framed as a struggle for women to have sex with men on the same terms as men: ‘without 
consequences.’”). 
 13 Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and Religious Freedom, 
58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 435 (2013). 
 14 See J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 521 (1994) (arguing that no-fault divorce “yielded divorce on demand, with 
little heed to the inequities of property division and child and spousal support”); see also Kerry Abrams, 
Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2012) (“The possibility of ‘divorce on demand’ created 
the potential for the widespread instrumental use of marriage as a vehicle for opting into particular 
benefits of marriage and then opting out before the burdens became oppressive.”). 
 15 Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
573, 578–79 (2016). 
 16 See, e.g., Alvaré, supra note 13, at 409 (lamenting “the widespread legalization and availability of 
both contraception and abortion” that has led to a more permissive sexual culture); Ross Douthat, More 
Imperfect Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/ 
opinion/sunday/douthat-more-imperfect-unions.html [https://perma.cc/AP5B-LSF2] (arguing that 
liberalization of divorce and abortion laws has led to a less accountable culture, exacerbating family 
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The changes in the law’s response to rape, sexual assault, and sexual 
harassment have also prompted divergent views. Although many have 
applauded these changes as an important step forward in securing gender 
equality, others argue that the changes are inadequate and ineffective. Many 
progressive critics maintain that incidents of rape and sexual assault are 
underenforced by the state and underreported because of victim-blaming and 
the persistence of state-sanctioned gender norms.17 They also maintain that 
the state has failed to properly oversee incidents of workplace sexual 
harassment and impose consequences on employers in workplaces where 
harassment is rife.18 
Obviously, both groups—and the critiques that they have lodged—are 
very different. One group bemoans the secularization of sexual culture, while 
the other laments the inadequacy of efforts to combat harassment and sexual 
violence. But despite these core differences, present in both critiques is a 
sense of the state’s failure. For social conservatives, the changes wrought by 
decriminalization of “deviant” sexual behavior, the shift to no-fault divorce 
regimes, and the recognition of constitutional protections for sex and 
sexuality suggest that the state has abdicated its historic role in imposing 
limits on sex.19 On the other hand, for progressives (and especially 
feminists), the changes in the law’s response to sexual harassment and sexual 
assault have not gone far enough. As they explain, state efforts to properly 
regulate rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment are, at best, anemic and, 
at worst, utterly ineffectual.20 Indeed, their conclusions about the state of 
 
instability); Mary Eberstadt, A Time of Reckoning, WKLY. STANDARD (June 15, 2018, 4:51 AM), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/mary-eberstadt/five-reasons-the-sexual-revolution-has-been-a-
disaster?_amp=true [https://perma.cc/SE82-N7CR] (tracing an increase in “broken families” back to “the 
destigmatization and mass adoption of artificial contraception . . . followed by widespread legalization of 
abortion”). 
 17 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 
232 (2015) (discussing how, despite reforms in rape and sexual assault law, the number of rape reports 
leading to arrest has declined and conviction rates of rape have not increased). 
 18 See Estrich, supra note 10, at 833–34. 
 19 See, e.g., Donald Devine, Same-Sex Marriage Isn’t About Freedom, AM. CONSERVATIVE (June 
27, 2013), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/same-sex-marriage-isnt-about-freedom 
[https://perma.cc/J8ZT-PFMF] (arguing that “the lack of . . . limits in contemporary America portends 
the end of Western culture and represents its final ‘deconversion’ from Christianity”). 
 20 See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 32–40 (2017) (discussing how courts have created frameworks that enable them 
to limit or skirt enforcement of sexual harassment claims); Francis X. Shen, How We Still Fail Rape 
Victims: Reflecting on Responsibility and Legal Reform, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 (2011) (“The 
thirty-year period from 1977 to 2007 in the United States saw much innovation in sex crime law, . . . [but] 
these changes have done little to eliminate the fundamental myths about blame attribution that permeate 
many aspects of criminal and civil rape law.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Sexual Assault Survivors’ 
Rights Act Is Not Enough, TIME (June 9, 2016), http://time.com/4361989/sexual-assault-survivors-rights-
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sexual regulation in these areas mirror conservative views about the 
regulation of adult, consensual sex. As these progressives see it, the state 
does not regulate in this area as robustly as it should, levying few 
consequences on those who commit sexual harassment and sexual assault 
and leaving victims with meager remedies and limited avenues for redress.21 
But it is not just that these two groups have a shared sense that the state 
has failed to properly regulate sex and sexuality; it is that they have 
responded in uncannily similar ways to the state’s lapses. As both groups 
recognize, the state’s failure to properly regulate sex and sexuality has 
yielded a space in which private actors on both sides of the ideological 
spectrum may play a critical role in both challenging extant sexual norms 
and articulating new visions of appropriate sex and sexuality. The efforts of 
these two constituencies is evident in the rise and proliferation of religious 
refusals and conscience exemptions,22 as exemplified in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,23 and in the emergence 
of the #MeToo movement.24 Let me take each of these in turn. 
 
act [https://perma.cc/4MAA-WAXK] (contending that rape law reform proposals have been “woefully 
inadequate” because they fail to address issues of gender bias). 
 21 See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Is Sexual Harassment a Civil Rights Violation? It Should Be, ACLU: 
SPEAK FREELY (Jan. 26, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/sexual-harassment-
civil-rights-violation-it-should-be [https://perma.cc/SSL5-Z6QC] (contending that the state needs to 
enact “more meaningful measures of accountability,” including federal and state civil rights remedies). 
 22 See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims 
in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518–19 (2015) (discussing conscience exemptions in the 
same-sex marriage context); see also Melissa Murray, Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold, 
124 YALE L.J.F. 324, 330 (2015) (noting that conscience exemptions “recall earlier criminal prohibitions 
on contraception” because they “cultivate social meanings about contraception and contraceptive use”). 
 23 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 24 The #MeToo movement was founded over ten years ago by activist Tarana Burke to build a 
support network primarily aimed at young women of color who had been victims of sexual violence. 
Abby Ohlheiser, The Woman Behind ‘Me Too’ Knew the Power of the Phrase When She Created It—10 
Years Ago, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/ 
10/19/the-woman-behind-me-too-knew-the-power-of-the-phrase-when-she-created-it-10-years-ago 
[https://perma.cc/4X8T-EYR8]. The movement gained widespread national exposure in 2017 in the form 
of a hashtag, #MeToo, in the days after sexual harassment allegations against Harvey Weinstein surfaced, 
when actress Alyssa Milano tweeted: “If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a 
reply to this tweet.” Samantha Schmidt, #MeToo: Harvey Weinstein Case Moves Thousands to Tell Their 
Own Stories of Abuse, Break Silence, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/16/me-too-alyssa-milano-urged-
assault-victims-to-tweet-in-solidarity-the-response-was-massive [https://perma.cc/93TL-VB8B]; Alyssa 
Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/BNP8-H8NJ]. Despite 
this history, it may be difficult to speak concretely of the goals and aims of the #MeToo movement vis-
à-vis the state, as the movement includes various strands and sub-groups. For purposes of this Article, I 
have focused on those strands of the movement that have articulated particular policy goals and interests 
under the label #MeToo. I am grateful to Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer for helpful conversations on 
this point. 
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In recent years, in the face of generally applicable laws that would 
require them to, inter alia, provide contraception and abortion services and 
provide goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis, religious 
conservatives have sought conscience exemptions and accommodations 
from these laws.25 As they explain, requiring believers to provide 
contraception or abortion services, or goods and services for a same-sex 
wedding, would make them “complicit” in conduct their faiths deem 
“sinful.”26 In this regard, religious conservatives view themselves as 
minorities in an increasingly secular culture27 and, as such, seek space and 
accommodation from the state to be able to conduct themselves in 
accordance with the tenets of their faiths. 
While those asserting conscience objections may insist that the issue is 
simply about securing space for religious exercise and observance in an 
increasingly secular culture,28 we might understand their claims differently. 
Viewed through the lens of sexual regulation, these conscience objections 
are at once an effort to avoid the ambit of generally applicable laws and a 
bid to occupy the regulatory void in order to reassert and enforce traditional 
sexual mores that the state no longer enforces. On this account, social 
conservatives do not simply seek a “carve-out” for religious observance––
they are also clearly communicating their objections to the current status quo 
in which individuals enjoy the right to use contraception, obtain abortions, 
and marry a person of the same sex. Put differently, conscience objections 
enable these private actors to eschew the status quo and enact their own brand 
of sexual regulation in the state’s stead—and indeed, in the face of the state’s 
apparent embrace of more liberal sexual values. In this “carved-out” space, 
religious conservatives are free to articulate their own views of appropriate 
sex and sexuality and, through the denial of goods and services (and the 
 
 25 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex 
Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1418–29 (2012) 
(discussing religious conservatives’ attempts to use conscience exemptions to opt out of the contraceptive 
and abortion care requirements imposed by the Affordable Care Act of 2010). 
 26 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2518–19. 
 27 See id. at 2553; see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Political Active Minority Groups: 
A Response to NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J.F. 369, 370 (2016) (“Religious conservatives make the 
individual-rights arguments of a minority group because they are a minority group.” (emphasis added)). 
 28 Many of the amicus briefs submitted to the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop raised this point. See, 
e.g., Brief of Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing that, although one’s religious values may be “out of 
sync with those of 2017 America,” conscience objections are necessary to allow individuals to live 
according to their personal religious codes); Brief of Christian Business Owners Supporting Religious 
Freedom as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 
16-111) (arguing that “[p]etitioners’ religious objection is, and always has been, based solely on religious 
grounds, and not on any animosity toward Respondents or their sexual orientation”). 
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expression of judgment that accompanies such denials), levy consequences 
on those who do not comport with this vision.29 
But it is not just social conservatives who are assuming the state’s role 
in regulating a particular vision of appropriate sex and sexuality. Progressive 
voices have also stepped in to fill what they perceive as a regulatory void, 
taking steps to privately regulate sexual harassment and sexual assault. The 
emergence of the #MeToo movement illustrates this development. #MeToo 
and its efforts respond directly to the view that the state has failed to impose 
appropriate consequences on those who commit sexual harassment and 
sexual assault.30 No longer willing to accept a culture where these behaviors 
are tacitly condoned and victims’ injuries go unremedied, the #MeToo 
movement enlists private entities as agents of reform to both challenge––and 
ultimately replace––extant norms of sexual conduct. Using social media and 
the press, the #MeToo movement has identified recidivist harassers and 
workplaces where sexual harassment and sexual assault are rife,31 advocated 
for increased workplace harassment training,32 and, ultimately, called for the 
expulsion from the workplace of several high-profile men who, for years, 
engaged in objectionable conduct with impunity.33 In this regard, like 
conservatives who register religious-based objections to same-sex marriage, 
abortion, and contraception, the #MeToo movement, in circumventing extant 
legal remedies and pursuing redress and reform through private means, calls 
on private actors––not the state––to mete out proper consequences for sexual 
harassment and sexual assault. 
The comparison between Masterpiece Cakeshop and #MeToo may 
strike some as odd—indeed, deeply discordant. To be clear, in comparing 
the two, I do not mean to suggest that they are exact analogues. They are not. 
 
 29 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2566–78 (outlining what they term the third-party “material” 
and “dignitary” harms associated with conscience exemptions). 
 30 The related #TimesUp movement, started by women in the entertainment industry, has also 
publicly appealed to private actors, including corporations and the media, to combat sexual harassment 
and discrimination in the workplace. Our Letter of Solidarity, TIME’S UP (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://www.timesupnow.com/home [https://perma.cc/FMA6-ZENX?type=image]. 
 31 See, e.g., Dan Corey, A Growing List of Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct Since Weinstein, NBC 
NEWS (published Nov. 8, 2017, 3:50 PM; updated Jan. 10, 2018, 3:34 PM), https://www.nbcnews. 
com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/weinstein-here-s-growing-list-men-accused-sexual-misconduct-
n816546 [https://perma.cc/LAU3-YQM3]; Julia Horowitz, Workplace Sexual Harassment Claims Have 
Spiked in the #MeToo Era, CNN BUS. (Oct. 5, 2018, updated 8:41 AM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2018/10/04/business/eeoc-sexual-harassment-reports/index.html [https://perma.cc/7FK3-XG5L]. 
 32 See Jodi Kantor, #MeToo Called for an Overhaul. Are Workplaces Really Changing?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/us/sexual-harassment-workplace-response.html 
[https://perma.cc/A3FG-7JDG]. 
 33 Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct and Their Fall 
from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-
accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/F2ZX-AW7A]. 
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There are several important points of distinction, which this Article later 
elaborates. But despite these differences, both movements share surprising 
features, and viewing them in tandem provides a helpful framework for 
analyzing this intriguing regulatory development. Indeed, setting aside their 
substantively different aims, Masterpiece Cakeshop and #MeToo may both 
be seen as attempts by private actors to regulate sexual conduct. Private 
actors regulating is not, by itself, novel; private actors have exerted 
regulatory influence, often echoing the state’s regulatory agenda. What 
distinguishes these acts of private regulation is that, in both Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and #MeToo, private actors are not bound by the state’s vision of 
appropriate sex and sexuality.34 When these private actors regulate, they are 
doing so for the express purpose of advancing their particular vision of 
appropriate sex and sexuality. For conservatives seeking religious 
exemptions, it is a return to the traditional sexual mores that held sway a 
generation ago. For the #MeToo movement, it is a vision of sex and sexuality 
that takes seriously the harms of sexual misconduct and advances more 
rigorous norms of consent. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I begins by defining the term 
“regulation” and briefly outlining various theories of regulation. Part II 
considers the role that private actors have played in reinforcing—and 
challenging—the state’s regulatory agenda. As it explains, private actors 
have often played a regulatory role—particularly in contexts where norms 
are in flux or contested. Part III then considers the changes in the state’s 
regulation of sex and sexuality that have unfolded over the last sixty years. 
As this Part explains, constituencies on both ends of the political spectrum 
have viewed these changes with skepticism. For conservatives, the 
liberalization of sexual norms signals the state’s abdication of the project of 
enforcing traditional sexual mores. For progressives, the state’s efforts to 
reform the legal regime governing sexual harassment and sexual assault have 
been ineffectual, allowing harassers to go unpunished and depriving victims 
of remedies and redress. On both accounts, the state has failed to properly 
regulate sex and sexuality. Using Masterpiece Cakeshop and the #MeToo 
movement as exemplars, Part IV focuses on the responses to the state’s 
perceived regulatory lapses. As it explains, both constituencies have 
responded to the state’s perceived failures by shifting to and leveraging 
forms of private regulation. In this regard, the private regulation seen in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and #MeToo is noteworthy because it evinces a novel 
turn in the regulation of sex and sexuality. In the absence of appropriate state 
regulation of sex and sexuality, private actors are attempting to fill the 
 
 34 See infra Part IV. 
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regulatory void by taking on a more visible role in regulating sex and 
sexuality. More importantly, in doing so, these private actors are engaging 
in a kind of geographic transmutation. That is, they are recasting parts of the 
public sphere as private space suitable for the imposition of their own private 
norms. Part V considers the implications of these developments. The Article 
then briefly concludes. 
I. THEORIES OF REGULATION 
At the outset, let me say a word about regulation and suggest how we 
might sketch the contours of what constitutes regulatory action. There is 
ample literature on the topic of regulation. Indeed, there exists a robust 
debate among scholars regarding the definition of regulatory activity and 
when one actor may be said to have regulated another.35 For the purposes of 
this Article, I define “regulation” as an action that shapes, guides, restricts, 
or punishes behavior through the imposition of consequences, whether legal 
or extralegal.36 To this end, regulation need not be an exclusive project of the 
state—although, as this Article argues, the state historically has served as the 
most visible source of regulatory power, particularly in the area of sexual 
regulation. This Part discusses various regulatory forms, including public 
regulation, private regulation, and regulatory forms that share public and 
private attributes. 
In its most explicit iteration, the state directly regulates through the 
enactment of legislation, or lawmaking. Historically, the most forceful (and 
violent) form of this regulation, especially in the context of the regulation of 
sex and sexuality, has been criminal law.37 But equally as important, state 
regulation of sex has also included civil law, as well as regulations 
promulgated by government agencies.38 This type of public regulation is not 
just enacted but is also enforced by the state: the state creates the law, locates 
 
 35 For approaches to defining and theorizing “regulation,” see ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: 
LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 1–3 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 1994); Robert Baldwin et al., 
Introduction: Regulation––The Field and the Developing Agenda, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
REGULATION 5–6 (Baldwin et al. eds., 2010); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating 
the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–86 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago 
School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–64 (1998); Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 
64 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 89–95 (2011); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
57, 70–73 (2013); and Barak Orbach, What Is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. REG. ONLINE 1, 4–6 (2012). 
 36 Black’s Law Dictionary defines regulation as “[c]ontrol over something by rule or restriction.” 
Regulation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 37 See Murray, supra note 15, at 607. 
 38 For a discussion of civil regimes in the context of the regulation of sex and sexuality after 
Lawrence v. Texas, see generally id. at 584–95, where the Court describes how public employers used 
professional codes of conduct, workplace fraternization policies, and concerns about institutional 
reputation to regulate employees’ consensual, nonmarital sex. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
836 
and labels offenders, and imposes consequences. Although private actors 
may to varying degrees play a role in shaping the norms that are ultimately 
codified into law, formal control rests with the state.39 
At the other end of the spectrum, there exists wholly private regulation, 
purportedly outside of the state’s reach. These private regulatory forms 
include, for example, contract law, a system of privately created 
arrangements.40 This type of regulation may also include what some call 
private ordering, in which private actors step in voluntarily and 
independently to fill what they perceive as gaps in state regulation.41 
Although these forms of regulation are nominally private, it would be a 
mistake to assume that they are entirely outside of the state’s ambit. When 
private individuals seek to regulate their own conduct via contract, they often 
turn to the public sphere and, specifically, the courts to enforce contractual 
terms when disputes arise. They must similarly do so to bring private tort 
actions.42 By the same token, private organizational entities may also engage 
in interplay with the state. For example, the Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) standards are organized and awarded by the 
U.S. Green Building Council (“the Council”). Although the Council is a 
private entity, its efforts to shape environmental policies often influence and 
are influenced by public regulation.43 
While the distinction between public and private regulation may appear 
semantic on its face, it has seismic constitutional implications. Critically, if 
a regulation is deemed “public,” it is subject to constitutional limitations, 
such as due process, antidiscrimination principles, or restrictions on speech.44 
Private actors are not subject to the same restrictions, unless their actions are 
governed by legislation or state oversight in some capacity.45 
 
 39 But see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000) 
(discussing how private actors often remain “deeply involved in regulation,” whether acting in an 
advisory capacity or with explicit decision-making authority). 
 40 But see id. at 588–90 (discussing how, even in purportedly private arrangements, the government 
has often imposed rudimentary due process requirements on parties). 
 41 See Emily S. Bremer, Private Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L. REV. 1115, 1120 
(2016) (noting how, in private ordering, private actors attempt to “achieve traditionally public ends in 
spaces where no governmental regulation presently exists”). Professor Bremer provides the example here 
of private environmental governance, which has produced a system of collective standards even as no 
public law requires compliance with them. Id. 
 42 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV 873, 886 (1987) (discussing how state 
officials are, on a daily basis, involved in the enforcement of private law). 
 43 Bremer, supra note 41, at 1120; Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
2011, 2012–13 (2017). 
 44 Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-
Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON. U. C.R.L.J. 203, 208–09 (2001). 
 45 Id. at 209. Such legislation includes, for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
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Notably, there has been significant scholarly criticism of the notion that 
any state regulation may be classified as purely public or private or that 
public and private spaces exist in silos. Some argue that the public–private 
divide has effectively collapsed because virtually all private action can be 
traced back to a public action, inaction, or grant of power.46 Indeed, critics 
argue that modern private arrangements, such as tort, property, and contract 
law, are at their inception carved out by state actors, as well as enforced in 
the courts.47 To this end, any time a “private” action occurs, it does so against 
a backdrop of state regulation permitting, narrowing, or circumscribing its 
execution.48 
The notion of a blurred public–private regulatory line is further 
complicated by privatization. As an initial matter, the term privatization has 
multiple meanings and interpretations.49 Broadly, privatization typically 
describes circumstances where certain government functions, services, or 
responsibilities are transferred to the private sector, often to for-profit 
corporations.50 Most commonly, privatization takes one of several forms, 
including “contracting out,” which enables the use of private actors to 
execute governmental programs or provide state services, creating shared 
authority between the public and private spaces.51 The state has heavily relied 
 
 46 Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence 
of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 334 (1993) (discussing the “regime of state 
prohibitions and either explicit or implicit state permissions” underlying private action). Professor Kay 
identifies the notionally private sphere of domestic life as an example, observing that “it is impossible to 
deal with the rights and wrongs of family behavior without considering the dense complex of marriage 
law, custody law, property law, education law and other legal relations against which every private action 
takes place.” Id. at 335. While I would disagree with the notion that domestic relations are wholly 
consigned to the private sphere, I take seriously the point that all conduct in the “private” sphere takes 
place against the backdrop of public law, whether through the prospect of adjudication and enforcement 
or through legal defaults that shape private conduct. 
 47 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 886. 
 48 As Professor Kay writes, even “the characterization as private is itself a public matter.” Kay, supra 
note 46, at 337. This has posed a problem for legal concepts such as the state action doctrine, which 
mandates that the Constitution is only applicable to public action. Because of the difficulty of 
differentiating between public and private space, many scholars note that the doctrine has developed into 
a confused, incoherent regime that has produced inconsistent legal outcomes. See Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1411 (2003) (contending the Court’s application 
of the state action inquiry has been “beset by inconsistency and disagreement”); Louis Michael Seidman, 
The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 391 (1993) (noting the “confusing and 
contradictory” fact that, while the Court at once found judicial enforcement of racist covenants in Shelley 
v. Kraemer to be sufficient state action, it has never held the same for the enforcement of wills or the 
ejection of individuals from the home); William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 
14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 5 (1961) (discussing how the Court’s state action jurisprudence “has resulted in a 
variety of state action doctrines jutting out like the several unrelated heads of a hydra”). 
 49 Metzger, supra note 48, at 1377. 
 50 Id. at 1370–71, 1377–78. 
 51 Id. at 1371, 1378 n.17. 
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on privatization in many social welfare contexts, including public education 
(charter schools), law enforcement (private prisons), healthcare (Medicare- 
and Medicaid-funded private providers), and welfare programs (shelters run 
by private entities).52 
Other forms of shared regulatory responsibility within the privatization 
framework include what may be termed public–private partnerships. In this 
mode, private organizations—both for-profit and nonprofit––perform 
traditionally “public” responsibilities or address public needs.53 In most 
cases, the state maintains control over these partnerships through joint 
financial ventures or total financial support.54 Some may call this the virtual 
“deputization” of a private regulator, characterized by a formal connection 
between government and the private agent.55 
More recent scholarship has also considered the notion of “harnessing,” 
a form of privatization in which the state leverages the strength of the private 
sector to achieve public aims.56 As scholars note, the private sector’s 
competitive advantage in regulation rests in its ability to act more efficiently 
and quickly than the state and to reflect market interests.57 In civil rights law, 
for example, many statutes authorize attorney’s fees to incentivize private 
actors to bring lawsuits that are in the public interest.58 These “private 
attorneys general” effectively complement—and in some instances, 
exceed—the state’s efforts to enforce the terms of civil rights statutes.59 
Some cast this as a form of deputization, as private actors become 
 
 52 Id. at 1380–94. 
 53 Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229, 1230 (2003). 
 54 See id. at 1240–41. 
 55 Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their 
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 168–69, 171 (1989). 
 56 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui 
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1246–56 (2012) (discussing the role of private enforcers in 
recouping money from perpetrators of fraud against the government under the False Claims Act); Myriam 
E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of 
Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1414–24 (2000) (proposing a federal statute under which the 
Department of Justice could deputize private litigants to bring suit against local police departments for 
constitutional violations); Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & 
ADMIN. L. 291, 324–26 (2014) (discussing private regulation in the context of federal agencies relying on 
third-party verification programs). 
 57 See McAllister, supra note 56, at 294. 
 58 Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 186 (noting 
that “[v]irtually all modern civil rights statutes rely heavily on private attorneys general”). 
 59 Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American 
Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1346–50 (2012); see also Engstrom, supra note 56, at 1253 (describing 
the state’s role in encouraging an optimal level of private enforcement). 
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responsible for executing state aims.60 Indeed, as Professor Myriam Gilles 
explains, these provisions position the “archetypal citizen as an intermediary 
for achieving public goals.”61 
Critically, all of these traditional privatization regimes, especially in the 
context of education, criminal justice, and other areas where the state has a 
historic monopoly on regulation, function as a kind of deputization whereby 
the state, of its own accord, enters into an arrangement with the private actors 
to assist in executing state aims. Whether this occurs through formation of a 
contract, or an engagement in a consulting or educational relationship with 
private actors, or the deliberate harnessing of private efficiencies to 
maximize public function, the state itself has historically drafted and dictated 
the contours of the relationship.62 To put it simply, the state has almost 
always taken the lead, while private actors have followed—indeed, echoed—
the state’s agenda. 
Beyond privatization and formal public–private partnerships, the state 
may also regulate in tandem with the private sphere through the creation and 
management of social norms.63 On this account, the state regulates by pulling 
levers that influence social behaviors, strategically deploying a variety of 
tools outside of lawmaking to guide what is cast as private choice. For 
example, the state may utilize strategic economic instruments (i.e., taxes or 
subsidies) or time, place, or manner restrictions (avoiding an absolute 
regulatory ban on conduct but burdening it nonetheless, as in prohibiting 
smoking in public spaces) to incentivize what the state deems positive 
behavior and to discourage negative behavior.64 The state may, by the same 
token, disseminate information and educate citizens as a form of indirect 
regulation, reinforcing the state’s preferred norms.65 It may also strategically 
 
 60 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 56, at 1388. 
 61 Id. at 1426. 
 62 See Metzger, supra note 48, at 1394–95 (“In many instances of privatization, the overall context 
remains one of significant government endeavor; . . . the government provides the funds, sets 
programmatic goals and requirements, or enacts the regulatory scheme into which private decisionmaking 
is incorporated.”). 
 63 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996). But 
see Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 
(1999) (noting that, although norms may be considered regulatory, “[n]orms are enforced . . . by a 
community, not by a government”). 
 64 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 948–52; see also Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 
59 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1112–14 (2010) (contending that these incentives are a type of indirect regulation 
as part of the “spectrum of state roles” in decision-making). 
 65 See Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 
864 (2010) (discussing the state’s use of heteronormative, marriage-focused sex education); Sunstein, 
supra note 63, at 948–49. 
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introduce or frame choices available to the individual;66 similarly, the state 
may deliberately package a series of choices in ways designed to channel 
individuals into a preferred institution.67 Accordingly, while the private 
sphere has, as this Article discusses, played an important role in the creation 
and cultivation of norms, it has also historically reinforced and echoed the 
state’s normative agenda.68 
The modern regulatory landscape, then, may be cast as a spectrum in 
which public and private actors both play a role in regulation. But despite the 
participation of both public and private actors, regulatory efforts are most 
visibly guided and shaped by the state.69 Nevertheless, as the following Part 
makes clear, even outside of traditional private law contexts like tort and 
contract, private actors have played an important role in reinforcing, and in 
some cases, challenging the state’s regulatory agenda. 
 
 66 Huntington, supra note 64, at 1114. For example, one spouse may feel more comfortable investing 
in family while the other invests in a career because the state-enforced default rule of equitable 
distribution of property upon dissolution of marriage “ensures that the individual with less earning 
potential still has a claim to marital assets.” Id. 
 67 For example, the state might encourage individuals to confine their sexual relationships to 
marriage. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 
919, 933 (2016) (explaining that, by reserving certain benefits for married couples, “the state incentivizes 
individuals to choose this official format for their sexual and intimate relationships”); Carl E. Schneider, 
The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 503 (1992) (describing how the law 
once worked to channel individuals into marriage by criminalizing same-sex intimacy and nonmarital 
sex). This “channelling” effect persists, even in a world where there are many alternatives to marriage. 
As Professor Bill Eskridge notes, various relationship forms—or “menus” of legal defaults and benefits—
have emerged to encourage adults to enter into stable, marriage-like relationships. William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 
100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1887–1902 (2012). 
 Likewise, the state routinely uses tax policy to shape individual behavior. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, JCX-40-11, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT 40 (2011), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3802 
[https://perma.cc/P5YR-5SXA] (“Because the Federal income tax allows taxpayers to deduct mortgage 
interest from their taxable income, but does not allow them to deduct rental payments, there is a financial 
incentive to buy rather than rent a home.”); David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the 
Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1687, 1706 & nn.90–91 (2014) (noting that state attempts to 
discourage soda, cigarette, and alcohol consumption through taxation may not enhance public welfare); 
see also Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1410 (2011) (“[S]ome taxes (and 
subsidies) intentionally reprice behavior in the hope of aligning it more closely with the social 
optimum.”). 
 68 See infra Section IV.A (outlining how private actors have historically worked to support state 
aims). 
 69 But see infra Part IV (describing the role of private actors in shaping and challenging public 
regulation). 
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II. CONTEXTUALIZING PRIVATE SEXUAL REGULATION 
Historically, the state was the primary driver of sexual regulation, 
shaping behavior by imposing consequences on those who did not comply 
with the normative understanding of marriage and appropriate sex and 
sexuality. To be clear, in saying that the state was the primary driver of 
sexual regulation, I do not mean to say that the state was the only actor 
involved in the regulation of sex and sexuality, or even that the state was the 
most important regulatory actor. Instead, I mean only that state regulation of 
sex was often the most visible form of sexual regulation. Laws criminalizing 
adultery, fornication, and a range of other sexual conduct provided a clear—
and, indeed, hyper-visible—understanding of sexual mores and 
expectations. 
But while the state may have visibly articulated extant sexual norms, it 
was not the only actor involved in policing and enforcing those norms. 
Private actors have often played a role, alongside the state, in regulating 
sexual conduct. This Part explores this claim. As it makes clear, private 
actors engaging in establishing and contesting norms is hardly novel. Indeed, 
private actors have often been engaged with—and against—the state in 
policing and enforcing social norms. The Sections that follow briefly sketch 
some of the forms this interaction between the private sphere and the state 
traditionally have taken. 
A. Private Actors Supporting the State 
Once norms are codified into law, private actors often played a role in 
supporting the state by using private action to cultivate compliance with the 
law. For example, community norms regarding sex and sexuality often 
reinforced laws and legal rules. Thus, not only did law specifically confine 
sex and sexuality to marriage by criminalizing out-of-wedlock sex and 
attaching significant legal impediments for those deemed illegitimate, 
private actors reinforced—in ways both subtle and overt—this normative 
regime through their own actions.70 In many communities, young women 
who dared to engage in sex outside of marriage faced considerable social 
ostracism and stigmatization.71 Similarly, today, although abortion is no 
 
 70 See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 367 (2011) (discussing how laws discriminating against 
children born out of wedlock facilitated societal discrimination and provided a private “invitation” to 
discriminate); see also Janet Hopkins Dickson, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or 
Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 926–27 (1991) (detailing the ways in which unmarried women were 
ostracized, including being forced to sit in the town square as a shaming technique). 
 71 Even today, although sex outside of marriage is relatively commonplace, overt expressions of 
female sexuality remain disfavored in many communities, prompting “slut-shaming” and other efforts to 
compel women to comply with gendered norms around sex and sexuality. See Wendy N. Hess, Slut-
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longer criminally proscribed, women who receive abortions confront 
considerable civil restrictions on the procedure, and meaningfully, these civil 
restrictions are often complemented by private actions that make clear the 
continued disapprobation of abortion care. For example, women who receive 
abortions face considerable stigma and disapproval of their decision—so 
much so that they often choose to keep their abortion experiences a secret.72 
Likewise, even after legalization, abortion providers face a web of state civil 
regulations, as well as stigma or private shaming from local community 
members intent on retrenching pro-life norms, at times resulting in threats to 
providers’ safety.73 In this regard, private actors often have complemented 
the state’s regulatory efforts by imposing private consequences on those who 
fail to comport with a particular vision of appropriate sex and sexuality. 
B. Private Actors Cultivating the State 
Private actors have not always assumed a posture that endorsed or 
reinforced the state’s regulatory agenda. Indeed, in some circumstances, 
private actors have chosen to articulate new norms in the hope of prompting 
the state to eventually adopt those norms as part of a state-sanctioned 
normative regime. Take, for example, the debate over same-sex marriage. 
For years, as legislators and courts debated the question of whether same-
sex couples should be eligible for the status, privileges, and benefits 
associated with state-recognized civil marriage, many corporations (both 
publicly and privately held) signaled support for same-sex couples and their 
families (and the prospect of civil recognition through marriage) by offering 
domestic partner benefits for their employees. As Professor Douglas 
NeJaime notes, corporate domestic partner policies were a key part of 
LGBTQ activists’ efforts to push state and local governments to extend 
rights and benefits to same-sex couples.74 That is, even as activists were 
 
Shaming in the Workplace: Sexual Rumors & Hostile Environment Claims, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 581, 597–99 (2016) (discussing research confirming, for example, that both men and women 
tended to view women who accepted an offer for casual sex as less competent and intelligent than a man 
who had accepted). 
 72 Paula Abrams, Abortion Stigma: The Legacy of Casey, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 299, 306 (2014). 
 73 In Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014), in 
striking down a state law that required every doctor performing abortions in Alabama to have “staff 
privileges” at a local hospital and that imposed criminal liability on those who performed abortions 
without such privileges, an Alabama federal district court specifically recounted the stigma that abortion 
providers faced in their communities. As the court documented, Alabama abortion providers reported that 
they were often singled out and ostracized from their communities for providing abortion services, risking 
their standing within the community and their ability to maintain a private practice. Id. at 1349–51. 
 74 See Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and 
Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 146–49 (2014) (noting that activists hoped “the 
interaction between legal recognition and employer-sponsored healthcare coverage [would] create[] a 
mutually constitutive relationship between public and private norms”). 
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encouraging corporations to adopt domestic partnership policies, they were 
also challenging municipalities to do so as well—with those very 
corporations acting as allies in the effort to prompt government action.75 
Under these employment policies, companies like Coca-Cola, Amazon, 
Google, Mattel, Nike, and Whole Foods provided LGBTQ employees with 
some of the benefits of marriage, even as same-sex relationships were 
ineligible for state marital recognition.76 Indeed, some maintain that the 
proliferation of these private employer policies, over time, contributed to 
greater acceptance of these once nontraditional unions, paving the way for 
the eventual legalization of same-sex marriage.77 
A similar case can be made for the role of corporations in advancing 
paid family leave policies in recent years. Beginning in 2015 and 2016, a 
slate of influential businesses, including American Express, Ikea, Amazon, 
Twitter, and Netflix, announced expanded paid family leave plans for their 
employees, offering, in many cases, several months of paid leave to new 
parents.78 Importantly, the United States is the only developed country in the 
world that does not provide paid maternity leave at the federal level,79 and 
only a handful of states have laws requiring paid family leave.80 In stark 
 
 75 See id. at 148 (describing how employers boosted the efforts of activists by adopting policies which 
“suggested that marriage and domestic partnership shared central features grounded in mutual support 
and commitment”). 
 76 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, 
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 2006–2007, at 35–50 (2007). 
 77 Emily Cadei, How Corporate America Propelled Same-Sex Marriage, NEWSWEEK (June 30, 2015, 
6:16 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/07/10/shift-corporate-america-social-issues-become-good-
business-348458.html [https://perma.cc/LV9P-TBVS]; see Jena McGregor, Corporate America’s 
Embrace of Gay Rights Has Reached a Stunning Tipping Point, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/04/05/corporate-americas-embrace-of-
gay-rights-has-reached-a-stunning-tipping-point [https://perma.cc/LV9P-TBVS]; Richard Socarides, 
Corporate America’s Evolution on L.G.B.T. Rights, NEW YORKER (Apr. 27, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/corporate-americas-evolution-on-l-g-b-t-rights 
[https://perma.cc/2X4Z-DKK6]. 
 78 Clare O’Connor, These Companies All Boosted Paid Parental Leave in 2016, FORBES (Dec. 30, 
2016, 3:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2016/12/30/these-companies-all-boosted-
paid-parental-leave-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/28BT-NPQS]. 
 79 Dayna M. Kurtz, We Have a Child-Care Crisis in This Country. We Had the Solution 78 Years 
Ago, WASH. POST (July 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/07/ 
23/we-have-a-childcare-crisis-in-this-country-we-had-the-solution-78-years-ago 
 [https://perma.cc/S9HL-CDGQ]; Gretchen Livingston, Among 41 Nations, U.S. Is the Outlier When It 
Comes to Paid Parental Leave, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/09/26/u-s-lacks-mandated-paid-parental-leave [https://perma.cc/7PA6-RZQK]. 
 80 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of January 2018, only four states—
California, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island—provide paid family leave. Paid Family Leave 
Resources, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/paid-family-leave-resources.aspx [https://perma. 
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contrast, all twenty of the biggest companies in the United States currently 
offer paid maternity leave policies.81 As with the decision to offer benefits to 
same-sex couples, corporate leave policies were not animated solely by a 
desire to influence public policy; indeed, many companies viewed the family 
leave policies as an effective tool for recruiting and retaining talent.82 
Despite the “business case” for paid leave, these private decisions did 
have an influence on public-sector policies. The business sector’s embrace 
of paid leave policies put pressure on federal and state governments to follow 
suit.83 As corporations have increasingly offered paid leave plans, public 
support for paid leave has surged, as has bipartisan interest in paid leave 
policies.84 In 2016, as corporations expanded their paid leave initiatives, 
virtually every Democratic presidential candidate—and many Republican 
candidates—discussed parental leave reform on the campaign trail, 
expressing a desire to pass paid leave legislation.85 Recently, the White 
House announced its support for the enactment of a paid leave law,86 and 
proposals have been floated across the aisle.87 Twenty-one states, for their 
part, have legislation pending on paid family leave, and several other states 
 
cc/7EEG-PH6N]. The District of Columbia and Washington State have each passed paid family leave 
laws and benefits that will go into effect in the coming years. Id. 
 81 Barbara Frankel & Audrey Goodson Kingo, A Record Number of Companies Are Increasing Paid 
Family Leave in 2018, WORKING MOTHER (updated June 29, 2018), 
https://www.workingmother.com/2018-might-see-record-number-companies-increasing-paid-parental-
leave [https://perma.cc/C9YL-3RPM]. 
 82 Rebecca Greenfield, More Companies Than Ever Offer Paid Parental Leave, BLOOMBERG (June 
28, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-28/more-companies-than-ever-
offer-paid-parental-leave. According to YouTube CEO Susan Wojcicki, paid leave benefits would help 
the “bottom line” by “avoid[ing] costly turnover” of working mothers at the company. Julie Kashen, Tech 
Companies Are Leading the Way on Paid Family Leave, CENTURY FOUND. (Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/tech-companies-paid-leave. 
 83 See Stephen Miller, Trump’s Paid-Parental-Leave Plan Plays Catch-Up to State and Corporate 
Programs, SHRM (May 24, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/benefits/pages/trump-paid-parental-leave-plan.aspx [https://perma.cc/MMY9-DFMN]. 
 84 Kathryn Vasel, Calls for Paid Family Leave Are Getting Louder, CNN MONEY (Feb. 13, 2018, 
5:06 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/13/pf/trump-budget-proposal-paid-family-leave/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/WN2S-TZCG]. 
 85 Kristin Rowe-Finkbeiner, Why America Needs a Paid Family Leave Act for All, TIME (Feb. 26, 
2018), http://time.com/5172814/paid-family-leave-policy [https://perma.cc/S8U2-FMRN]. 
 86 Ivanka Trump, Paid Family Leave Is an Investment in America’s Families—It Deserves Bipartisan 
Support, FOX NEWS (July 11, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/07/11/ivanka-trump-paid-
family-leave-is-investment-in-americas-families-it-deserves-bipartisan-support.html 
[https://perma.cc/GH89-V2WB]; see also Seung Min Kim, Ivanka, Rubio Find a New Project: Paid 
Family Leave, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2018, 6:54 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/04/rubio-
ivanka-trump-family-leave-385050 [https://perma.cc/AF8A-LWTQ]. 
 87 Kashen, supra note 82, at 12. 
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have enacted paid leave laws since 2016.88 As in the case of same-sex 
marriage, even though corporations did not squarely aim to spur state actors 
to regulate, corporate expansion of family leave benefits undoubtedly built 
public momentum around paid leave reform. 
C. Private Actors Challenging the State 
As the foregoing examples suggest, private actors can be effective 
players in the regulation of sex and sexuality.89 Their actions can reinforce 
the state’s regulatory vision, and in other circumstances, they provide a 
useful counterpoint to the state—one that may be particularly effective in 
cultivating state support for a new set of norms, as in the case of corporate 
support for domestic partnership benefits and paid family leave. 
That private action might play a role in circumstances where norms are 
contested and contestable is perhaps unsurprising. After all, circumstances 
in which norms are being evaluated––and reevaluated––are often places 
where private action can be deployed to shape substantive outcomes, even 
outside the realm of sex and sexuality.90 In these contexts, however, private 
actors frequently assume different postures vis-à-vis the state. In the case of 
domestic partnership benefits, corporations posited an alternative vision of 
limited recognition for same-sex couples, providing the state with a template 
for integrating LGBTQ persons into a system of public and private benefits. 
But private actors can also assume a more antagonistic posture vis-à-
vis the state, stepping forward to challenge the state’s articulation of socio-
legal norms. The history of the Civil Rights Movement is instructive on this 
point. In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education,91 many Southern 
jurisdictions balked at the Supreme Court’s command to desegregate public 
schools.92 Resistance to the Court’s mandate took many forms. Some school 
 
 88 Rebecca Gale, The National Fight for Paid Leave Has Moved to Statehouses, SLATE (May 2, 2018, 
11:42 AM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/05/the-national-fight-for-paid-leave-has-moved-into-
statehouses.html [https://perma.cc/C6YH-4AUD]. 
 89 Indeed, as Professor Vicki Schultz has argued for years, workplace sexual harassment policies 
have functioned to regulate sex and sexuality since their inception. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized 
Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2090 (2003). 
 90 See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 909 (1998) (suggesting, in the context of international political norms, that 
norm entrepreneurs may be more successful when the global community is “search[ing] for new ideas”); 
Louise Marie Hurel & Luisa Cruz Lobato, Unpacking Cyber Norms: Private Companies as Norm 
Entrepreneurs, 3 J. CYBER POL’Y 61, 72 (2018) (discussing Microsoft’s success in shaping cybersecurity 
norms after the failure of public institutions to do so). 
 91 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 92 Brown at 60: The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, NAACP LDF, 
http://www.naacpldf.org/brown-at-60-southern-manifesto-and-massive-resistance-brown 
[https://perma.cc/YCF9-VSMY]. 
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boards dragged their feet in terms of integrating public schools, while some 
grudgingly integrated but actively worked to suppress African American 
enrollment in integrated schools.93 Private actors often complemented these 
public acts with their own efforts to resist the imposition of new norms. For 
example, in many Southern cities and towns, resistance to Brown was 
expressed in the creation of “segregation academies”—private schools that 
were intended to provide white parents with a segregated alternative to the 
public schools.94 
Similar impulses have been documented in the housing context. In 
1917, the Supreme Court decided Buchanan v. Warley, unanimously 
invalidating a municipal ordinance that prohibited the sale of real property 
to blacks in white-majority neighborhoods or buildings and vice versa on the 
ground that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections 
for freedom of contract.95 The decision, however, did not lead to residential 
integration, as some might have hoped. In response to the Supreme Court’s 
rebuke of state-ordered residential segregation, private actors relied on 
restrictive covenants—deed restrictions that specified that property could not 
be sold to African Americans and other minority groups—to maintain 
racially segregated neighborhoods.96 In 1948’s Shelley v. Kraemer, the 
Supreme Court concluded that, although racially restrictive covenants were 
permissible, judicial enforcement of such covenants constituted 
unconstitutional state action.97 The ruling in Shelley was an important step 
forward, but it did not end residential segregation entirely. At the local level, 
banking and real estate practices—private actions—continued to facilitate 
neighborhood segregation.98 
It was not until the enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA) 
that racial, religious, and sex discrimination in real estate transactions were 
prohibited.99 But even this landmark measure offered an outlet for private 
 
 93 See id. 
 94 Id. Critically, these decisions had a lasting impact––some of these schools continue to operate in 
the South today, further exacerbating issues of segregation. Sarah Carr, In Southern Towns, ‘Segregation 
Academies’ Are Still Going Strong, ATLANTIC (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/national/archive/2012/12/in-southern-towns-segregation-academies-are-still-going-strong/266207 
[https://perma.cc/GXA8-ZLAG]. 
 95 245 U.S. 60, 60, 82 (1917). 
 96 Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical 
Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1977–78 (2015). 
 97 334 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1948). 
 98 Rose Cuison Villazor, Residential Segregation and Interracial Marriages, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2717, 2725 (2018). 
 99 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012). The FHA, which prohibits discrimination in the context of 
housing, was an analogue to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in 
public accommodations. 
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actors to contest the new norm of housing integration. The “Mrs. Murphy’s” 
exemption—so named for the hypothetical elderly widow who has converted 
a portion of her home into a rental apartment to supplement her limited 
income—provides that if a dwelling has four or fewer rental units and the 
owner lives in one of those units, the home is exempt from the FHA.100 The 
exemption permits private actors in this narrow context to avoid compliance 
with the FHA and vindicate their own preferences and biases.101 
While these examples from the Civil Rights Movement make clear the 
degree to which private actors may challenge the state and contest the state’s 
normative agenda, they also evince the state’s defense of its normative 
position, and indeed, its regulatory authority. Even as Southerners sought to 
resist integration, the federal government did not yield in its insistence on 
integration as its norm. Federal troops were deployed to enforce integration 
in public schools,102 while private institutions that defied the integration 
mandate were rendered ineligible for federal subsidies and tax exemptions.103 
As importantly, the federal government made its commitment to the new 
public norm of integration clear in the enactment of antidiscrimination 
 
 100 The “Mrs. Murphy” exemption first arose in connection with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when 
Republican Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont urged Congress to “integrate the Waldorf and other 
large hotels, but permit the ‘Mrs. Murphys,’ who run small rooming houses all over the country, to rent 
their rooms to those they choose.” ROBERT D. LOEVY, TO END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE 
PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 51 (1990). The exemption does not apply to rental 
advertising. Mrs. Murphy could not, for example, place an advertisement for the apartment that specified 
that certain groups were unwelcome to rent the available apartment or room. See Lee Anne Fennell, 
Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349, 383 (2017). 
 101 See Fennell, supra note 100, at 383–85. 
 102 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 
7, 114 (1994) (discussing President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s deployment of federal troops to Little Rock, 
Arkansas, after Governor Orval Faubus “called out the National Guard to prevent the admission of black 
students to Little Rock High School”); Peniel E. Joseph, Kennedy’s Finest Moment, N.Y. TIMES (June 
10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/opinion/kennedys-civil-rights-triumph.html 
[https://perma.cc/SCD2-TS5M] (discussing President John F. Kennedy’s 1963 speech condemning 
Alabama Governor George Wallace’s efforts to physically bar African American students from 
matriculating at the University of Alabama and characterizing the civil rights struggle as a “moral issue”). 
 103 For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits federal financial assistance for 
private institutions that discriminate on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); see also Note, 
Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated Private Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 922, 947 n.128 (1968) 
(describing how the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights interpreted Title VI to bar tax subsidies for 
segregated institutions). In announcing support for the provisions of Title VI, President Kennedy 
impressed upon the nation that “[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all 
races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial 
discrimination.” H.R. DOC. NO. 88-124, at 12 (1963). 
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legislation104—and strict limits on exemptions and accommodations.105 
Indeed, we might understand the enactment of antidiscrimination legislation 
as an effort to forestall private regulation—discrimination—that is at odds 
with the norms that have been officially adopted in the public sphere. 
 
*          *          * 
 
All of these examples suggest the many ways in which private actors 
historically have both complemented and challenged the state’s regulatory 
efforts. Importantly, however, these examples illustrate that, while private 
actors have, to some extent, been able to assert alternatives to the state’s 
preferred norms, these efforts have primarily existed on one of two planes. 
As in the case of corporate policies regarding same-sex partner benefits, 
private action can engage the state in a dialogue about contested norms. In 
this regard, private action can at once signal opposition or resistance to state-
sanctioned norms while also seeking the state’s engagement in the creation 
of a new mutually agreeable normative scheme.106 By contrast, as the 
examples of school desegregation and residential integration make clear, 
private action can take on a more antagonistic cast, challenging the state’s 
efforts to embed new norms through the advancement of an alternative 
normative agenda. 
This is all to say that private actors have often been engaged with—and 
against—the state in policing and enforcing social norms. And indeed, these 
private actions can be as forceful—and in some cases, more forceful—as 
state regulation in enforcing particular norms at the local level. In sketching 
the contours of these interactions between private actors and the state, I do 
not mean to suggest that these archetypes are exhaustive. Again, they provide 
 
 104 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012) (prohibiting racial 
discrimination in public accommodations and employment, in addition to federally financed programs); 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012) (prohibiting racial discrimination in housing). 
 105 For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows employers to justify some disparate 
treatment on the basis of a worker’s religion, sex, or national origin if they can point to a “bona fide 
occupational qualification” that makes such treatment reasonably necessary. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
However, no such bona fide occupational qualification exemption exists to justify differential treatment 
based on race. See id.; see also William N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex 
Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 332 (2017). The Fair 
Housing Act offers only limited exemptions from its prohibition against discrimination in housing. The 
Act’s accommodations for religious organizations do not apply where “membership in such religion is 
restricted on account of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a). Moreover, while the Fair Housing Act might allow 
“Mrs. Murphy’s” to discriminate in choosing their tenants, they cannot place advertisements that express 
preferences for certain racial groups. See supra note 100. 
 106 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, 
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2568–69 (1994). 
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a rough taxonomy that provides some structure for understanding #MeToo 
and the rise of religious exemption claims like those at issue in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop as efforts to privately regulate sex and sexuality. 
With this caveat in mind, the following Parts consider Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and the #MeToo movement as new iterations of this impulse 
toward private sexual regulation. As the following Parts explain, because the 
state’s role in regulating sex and sexuality is in flux, the dynamic between 
the state and private actors in regulation of sex and sexuality is also in flux. 
Part III documents these changes in state regulation of sex and sexuality. As 
it explains, the landscape of sexual regulation is evolving, with the state 
abdicating its predominant role in the regulation of sexual conduct. As Part 
IV explains, with the state receding from its traditional role in regulating sex 
and sexuality, private actors have moved to the fore to more clearly articulate 
their presence as sexual regulators. In this new dynamic, the state no longer 
takes the lead in dictating the pace and scope of regulation. Instead, private 
actors assume the state’s regulatory role and dictate their own vision of 
appropriate sex and sexuality. These regulatory developments, Part V 
explains, have important consequences for individual rights and the dynamic 
between the public and private spheres. 
III. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF  
SEXUAL REGULATION—THEN AND NOW 
To contextualize the changes in sexual regulation on which this Article 
is focused, this Part begins by sketching the arc of sexual regulation. It then 
examines the public’s response to the changes in sexual regulation. As it 
explains, the state has historically functioned as the principal engine of 
sexual regulation. In recent years, however, decriminalization,107 the 
constitutionalization of privacy,108 and changes in the legal understanding of 
marriage and divorce have radically altered the regulatory landscape, 
limiting the state’s regulatory reach. 
 
 107 As I have previously written, in the realm of sex and sexuality, this decriminalization effort is 
best represented by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court decriminalized 
contraceptive use for married individuals, and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), where the Court 
decriminalized sodomy. Murray, supra note 15, at 579–80, 619. 
 108 For further discussion on Lawrence as a high-water mark for the decriminalization movement and 
the constitutionalization of privacy, see Murray, supra note 15, at 578–84, 619. 
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A. Then 
Since at least the Founding, the state has engaged in the legal regulation 
of sex and sexuality.109 Traditionally, state regulation of sex and sexuality 
has occurred primarily, though not exclusively, through the use of the 
criminal law. Federal, state, and local governments routinely criminalized 
sexual conduct (and those engaged in it) deemed nonnormative.110 From 
criminal laws prohibiting fornication (sex outside of marriage) and adultery 
to laws criminalizing sodomy and contraceptive use, criminal law played a 
decisive role in marking, punishing, and regulating sexual conduct.111 
This criminal regulation of sex and sexuality was often supplemented 
and complemented by a civil regime that reinforced traditional sexual 
mores.112 At the heart of this civil regime was marriage, which served as the 
licensed locus for sex and the normative model for adult sexuality.113 
Marriage and its demands for sex and sexuality, in turn, were reinforced by 
a fault-based divorce regime that penalized spouses who engaged in adultery 
and other conduct deemed inimical to marriage.114 In addition to the laws of 
marriage and divorce, a range of other civil laws—from professional codes 
of conduct and amatory tort actions to rules governing the distribution of 
 
 109 See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 
IN AMERICA 15–32 (3d ed. 2012) (describing colonial statutes that prohibited acts such as premarital sex, 
sodomy, and adultery); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
127–32 (1993) (detailing state regulation—beginning in the colonial era—prohibiting fornication, 
adultery, and public indecency). 
 110 Murray, supra note 11, at 1049 (discussing the historical criminalization of acts such as 
fornication, adultery, and sodomy); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, 
and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1268 (2009) [hereinafter Murray, 
Strange Bedfellows] (“Family law says what marriage is, and criminal law underscores this normative 
understanding by criminalizing behavior, and actors, ineligible for marriage.”); see also Brief of 
Petitioners at 1, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102) (arguing that Texas’s criminal sodomy law 
“brand[ed] gay men and lesbians as lawbreakers and fuel[ed] a whole range of further discrimination”). 
 111 Murray, Strange Bedfellows, supra note 110, at 1267–71 (discussing the ways in which criminal 
law historically worked in tandem with family law to reinforce sexual and familial norms). 
 112 See Murray, supra note 15, at 607–08 (noting that, although civil penalties do not fit the 
categorical view of punishment associated with criminal sanctions, civil consequences are nonetheless 
punitive because they impose significant consequences); see also id. at 614 (“[C]riminal law’s expressive 
power to mark and label non-normative sex and sexuality as deviant has left a powerful impression on 
the law––and on the system of civil regulation that functioned by its side.”). 
 113 For a discussion of the state’s use of marriage regulation in conjunction with criminal law to 
channel individuals into what the state deemed to be legitimate sexual behavior (marital sex), see 
generally Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 114 Abrams, supra note 14, at 44–45 (discussing grounds for fault-based divorce and arguing that 
stringent fault-based divorce regimes paired with the state’s granting of federal marital benefits acted in 
concert to funnel spouses into––and keep them in––the marital institution). 
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intestate property—channeled individuals into marriage, where sex and 
sexuality could be controlled and made socially productive.115 
Under these civil and criminal regimes, the state was the most visible 
driver of regulatory activity, shaping behavior by imposing consequences on 
those who did not comply with the normative understanding of marriage and 
appropriate sex and sexuality. In this landscape, private actors played a 
crucial role, often reinforcing and amplifying the state’s normative agenda 
in the private sphere through extralegal means.116 But even as private actors 
played a role in regulating sex and sexuality, their actions were less visible 
than those of the state, which took the lead in articulating the regulatory 
agenda and a vision of appropriate sex and sexuality. But as the following 
Sections document, the state’s role in sexual regulation has changed, with 
the state’s presence receding in the regulation of sex and sexuality. This 
change in the state’s posture has prompted important regulatory responses. 
As Section C explains, as the state’s role in regulating sex and sexuality has 
shifted, private actors have come to the fore to assert a more visible role in 
the regulation of sex and sexuality. 
B. Now 
Over the last sixty years, however, much of the regulatory landscape 
has changed—and has done so dramatically. As an initial matter, criminal 
law’s once central role in regulating sex and sexuality has been transformed. 
Insofar as it concerns sex between two consenting adults, criminal law today 
lacks the powerful regulatory punch it once wielded.117 
In the face of shifting norms regarding sex and sexuality, legislatures 
repealed many laws criminalizing consensual adult sex, including laws 
criminalizing fornication, adultery, and sodomy.118 Those laws that remain 
languish in a state of desuetude, on the books but unenforced.119 These 
 
 115 See Murray, supra note 15, at 578 n.15 (noting that, while marriage acted as the primary civil site 
of sexual regulation, other forms of civil law similarly played a role in regulating sex and sexuality). 
 116 See JoAnne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall, and Continuing Uses of Adultery and 
Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 127, 133–34 (2014) (recounting the “double jeopardy” 
individuals convicted of sexual offenses in colonial times experienced when, after receiving criminal 
sanctions in the courts, they received “spiritual sanctions” by being publicly shamed in the church). 
 117 Murray, supra note 11, at 1069. 
 118 Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 888 (2016) 
(discussing how, “[b]y late twentieth century, criminal laws against adultery, sodomy, and fornication 
were rarely enforced or altogether repealed”); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Adultery: An Agenda for Legal 
Reform, 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 179, 181–85 (2015) (discussing adultery laws that remain on the books 
and the declining impact of those laws); Sweeny, supra note 116, at 155 (noting that “only a few states” 
still criminally sanction fornication and adultery). 
 119 The Supreme Court stated this explicitly in Lawrence v. Texas with regard to sodomy statutes, 
noting that “these prohibitions often were being ignored . . . . Georgia, for instance, had not sought to 
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changes can be attributed, in part, to increasingly progressive social mores 
around sex and sexuality. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s, a range of 
individuals and institutions—from sexologist Alfred Kinsey to the American 
Law Institute—acknowledged the disjunction between the criminal 
regulation of sex and the quotidian lives of most Americans.120 But changing 
sexual mores alone cannot explain the radical shifts in the regulatory 
landscape. These shifts were complemented—and indeed, made more 
robust—by the contemporaneous judicial recognition of constitutional 
privacy protections for intimate life, which imposed sharp limits on the 
state’s ability to use the criminal law to regulate private, consensual adult 
sex. In quick succession, the United States Supreme Court, relying on 
constitutional protections for individual privacy in each instance, invalidated 
criminal laws prohibiting contraception121 and abortion.122 
The shift in the state’s use of criminal law to regulate sex and sexuality 
also prompted a reappraisal of the civil regime governing sex. While 
marriage persists as the normative ideal for adult intimate life, a sexual life 
outside of marriage is no longer strictly verboten.123 Civil laws imposing 
legal impediments on children of illegitimate birth have been subjected to 
constitutional scrutiny and often were invalidated—a shift that appeared to 
make greater space for nonmarital sex and families.124 Additionally, the 
system of fault-based divorce, which demanded that spouses establish the 
wrongdoing of one spouse before a divorce could be obtained, slowly 
 
enforce its law for decades.” 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on 
adultery and fornication, at 435 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (noting 
that laws against fornication and adultery were “dead-letter statutes”); Sweeny, supra note 116, at 150 
(discussing how, by the 1980s, fornication and adultery prosecutions had virtually disappeared). 
 120 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court cited the American Law Institute’s (ALI) 1955 draft of the 
Model Penal Code, which specified that it did not recommend or provide for criminal penalties associated 
with private sexual conduct. 539 U.S. at 572. As the Court noted, the ALI justified this omission on three 
grounds, one of which was that “[t]he prohibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing conduct 
many people engaged in.” Id. For a cogent discussion of the ALI’s mid-century proposals, as well as 
Professor Alfred Kinsey’s studies of sexual behavior, which found that most Americans “routinely 
engaged in sexual acts and practices that violated the criminal laws of most jurisdictions,” see Murray, 
supra note 11, at 1049–52. 
 121 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 
(1965). 
 122 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
 123 As recently as 1960, however, the majority of states imposed criminal sanctions for fornication 
and adultery, although these laws largely lingered in a state of desuetude. Sweeny, supra note 116, at 149. 
 124 See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (striking a provision of Louisiana’s wrongful 
death law, which excluded illegitimate children from seeking relief as survivors); see also N.J. Welfare 
Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (striking a state welfare law denying benefits to children 
born out of wedlock). For further discussion of the evolution in the Court’s illegitimacy-based 
jurisprudence and its extension to the rights of unmarried fathers, see Melissa Murray, What’s So New 
About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 391–412 (2012). 
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crumbled amidst claims that it fostered collusion and fraud and diminished 
the legitimacy of the legal system.125 In its place, a “no-fault” system 
emerged, requiring only the initiative of one spouse—and no allegations of 
wrongdoing—in order to dissolve a marriage.126 As some critics argue, the 
transformation from fault-based to no-fault divorce ushered in a regime of 
“divorce on demand,” stripping divorce of its normative power.127 Some 
argue further that this development has significantly crippled marriage as an 
institution.128 
While the introduction of no-fault divorce altered the landscape of civil 
marriage, the introduction of civil rights for gay men and lesbians rendered 
a sea change in the normative understanding of marriage. In a breathtakingly 
brief period of time, the understanding of civil marriage has been 
transformed from an institution that was utterly antithetical to homosexuality 
to one that may comfortably accommodate LGBTQ persons.129 
These legal changes did not occur in a vacuum. Indeed, they responded 
to, or occurred in tandem with, profound changes within society—the 
constitutionalization of privacy rights, the Civil Rights Movement, the 
women’s rights movement, the LGBTQ rights movement, and the racial and 
 
 125 See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2000) (arguing that the fault system was unpopular and many consistently 
called for its reform); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 809, 826–27 (1998) (noting that fraud and collusion were prevalent in fault-based 
regimes). 
 126 For a concise discussion of the rise of no-fault regimes in the 1970s, see Douglas NeJaime, 
Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (2016). 
 127 DiFonzo, supra note 14, at 519 (“The elimination of grounds transformed mutual consent divorce, 
the operating milieu for most of the twentieth century, into divorce on demand. . . . [This] has resulted in 
a significant loss for women.”); see also Dirk Johnson, Attacking No-Fault Notion, Conservatives Try to 
Put Blame Back in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 1996), http://www.nytimes. 
com/1996/02/12/us/attacking-no-fault-notion-conservatives-try-to-put-blame-back-indivorce.html 
[https://perma.cc/J2VT-PKM6]. For a conservative critique of no-fault regimes, see MAGGIE 
GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: HOW WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE 148–52 (1996), which 
details that the relative ease with which divorces can be obtained under no-fault law “encourages the urge 
to flee,” causing marriages to “suddenly ‘irretrievably break down.’” However, some have argued that 
no-fault divorce regimes are no less contentious, bitter, or efficient than their fault-based predecessors. 
Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After Divorce, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 441, 463–68 (2008). 
 128 Judge Robert Bork, for one, has argued that no-fault divorce does “enormous damage to the 
marriage.” Peter Robinson, Robert’s Rules of Order: A Conversation with Robert Bork, HOOVER 
INSTITUTION: UNCOMMON KNOWLEDGE (July 16, 2003), https://www.hoover.org/research/roberts-rules-
order-conversation-robert-bork [https://perma.cc/RJJ3-QS9A]. 
 129 Chris Cillizza, How Unbelievably Quickly Public Opinion Changed on Gay Marriage, in 5 
Charts, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/26/ 
how-unbelievably-quickly-public-opinion-changed-on-gay-marriage-in-6-charts 
 [https://perma.cc/HX8U-VH4A]. 
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gender integration of most workplaces and institutions.130 Nor were they the 
only changes in the legal regulation of sex and sexuality. Even as the laws 
governing “normative” sex and sexuality were being relaxed, laws governing 
forms of sexual conduct deemed harmful and problematic were also being 
reconsidered.131 In the 1970s and 1980s, at the urging of feminist reformers 
and women’s rights advocates, many jurisdictions began to focus on the legal 
regulation of rape and sexual assault.132 Courts and legislatures slowly began 
to eliminate the resistance requirement that, historically, had defined the 
crime of rape, and critically, had complicated efforts to successfully 
prosecute claims.133 In an effort to narrow the influence of the complainant’s 
precipitating or past sexual conduct, reformers also sought to redefine rape 
in terms of the absence of affirmative consent, placing the burden of 
soliciting and securing consent squarely on the person desiring sex.134 
 
 130 See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The 
Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 32–34 (2005) (outlining how the Court’s 
decisions in Griswold and Roe reflected shifting social norms of the sexual revolution); Jackie Gardina, 
The Tipping Point: Legal Epidemics, Constitutional Doctrine, and the Defense of Marriage Act, 34 VT. 
L. REV. 291, 294 (2009) (discussing how these movements occurred alongside the Court’s decisions to 
strike antimiscegenation laws and laws prohibiting access to contraception, among others); Douglas 
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to 
Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 99–100 (2014) (tracing how the spread of no-fault regimes coincided 
with both rising rates of nonmarital cohabitation as well as Supreme Court decisions striking distinctions 
based on illegitimate birth); Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship Recognition for Couples 
Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 LAW & INEQ. 345, 347 (2010) 
(discussing the connections between the LGBT rights movement, the women’s rights movement, and the 
Civil Rights Movement). 
 131 That the loosening of legal and social norms surrounding sex would prompt a reappraisal of law’s 
treatment of rape and sexual assault is perhaps unsurprising. After all, the legal regulation of rape and 
sexual assault was part and parcel of the state’s efforts to police sex and sexuality and enforce sexual 
norms of chastity and marital sexuality. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) 
(contending that rape law served as a defense for women who had engaged in nonconsensual sex outside 
of marriage and, as such, was always part of the state’s effort to limit sexual autonomy and confine sex 
and sexuality to marriage); Murray, Strange Bedfellows, supra note 110, at 1269–70 (noting how criminal 
law’s “refus[al] to characterize spousal violence as assault and unwanted conjugal sex as rape . . . 
underscored that marriage was a status relationship with attendant obligations and prerogatives that could 
not be redefined or renegotiated by the parties”). 
 132 Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 973–74 
(noting that reformers of that period aimed to eliminate many of the perceived injustices of rape law, 
including the utmost resistance requirement, prompt complaint rule, and marital rape exception). 
 133 Id. at 962–68 (tracing the “movement from the common law’s utmost resistance requirement to 
today’s general absence of a formal resistance requirement”). 
 134 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 102 (1987) (“[I]t does not seem so much to ask men, and the law, 
to respect the courage of the woman who does say no and to take her at her word.”); STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 271 (1998) 
(arguing that “[t]he person who wants to have intercourse must be sure he has a clear indication of the 
other person’s consent”); Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 429–30 (2016); 
Rebecca Beitsch, #MeToo Movement Has Lawmakers Talking About Consent, PEW: STATELINE (Jan. 23, 
2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/01/23/metoo-
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Alongside these changes to the legal definition of rape, reformers also 
agitated for rape shield laws that would prevent the defense from introducing 
evidence of complainants’ past sexual conduct or evidence of “precipitating” 
factors, like dress.135 These evidentiary reforms, it was argued, would reduce 
the barriers that victims faced in bringing charges, while also limiting the 
role that sexism and gendered stereotypes might play in juror fact-finding 
and decision-making.136 
Critically, feminist reformers were not exclusively concerned with the 
issue of rape and sexual assault. The proliferation of gender-integrated 
workplaces also brought the issue of sexual harassment to the fore in the late 
1980s and 1990s.137 Arguing that sexual harassment subverted gender 
integration and equality in the workplace, feminists successfully expanded 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination and other forms of 
discrimination in employment to include sexual harassment.138 As the legal 
landscape was transformed to condemn sexual harassment as a form of 
employment discrimination, individual workplaces responded by developing 
internal policies and procedures for reporting, addressing, and redressing 
workplace harassment claims.139 
C. Responding to the Changing Landscape of Sexual Regulation 
The changes in the landscape of sexual regulation have prompted a 
range of reactions. For progressives, the liberalization of sexual attitudes and 
 
movement-has-lawmakers-talking-about-consent [https://perma.cc/A2SV-EXDL]; Katie Mettler, ‘No 
Means No’ to ‘Yes Means Yes’: How Our Language Around Sexual Consent Has Changed, WASH. POST: 
SOLO-ISH (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2018/02/15/no-means-no-
to-yes-means-yes-how-our-language-around-sexual-consent-has-changed [https://perma.cc/ 
4BKH-7DM4]. 
 135 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 600 n.96 (2009) 
(surveying various federal and state laws excluding precipitating evidence). 
 136 Aya Gruber, Rape Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 285–86 (2016) (outlining the 
“second-wave feminist” ideas behind the enactment of rape shield laws). 
 137 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685 (1998) (“Over 
the past twenty years, feminists have succeeded in naming ‘sexual harassment’ and defining it as a social 
problem.”). 
 138 The Supreme Court unanimously recognized a Title VII sex discrimination claim in 1986, holding 
that “[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s 
sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 
(1986). For a discussion of how feminists successfully constructed the argument that sexual harassment 
was in itself a form of sex discrimination, see Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 8–18 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2004). 
 139 Some scholars argue that these structural reforms have incentivized employers to control and 
regulate even low-level sexual behavior in the workplace, creating an overly policed, “sanitized” work 
environment that may actually undercut goals of gender equality. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 89, at 
2131–36. 
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the diminished legal regulation of normative sex have been especially 
welcome.140 Others, however, take a dimmer view. For social conservatives, 
these changes signal a break with traditional sexual mores. They portend a 
new, liberal culture in which sex routinely occurs outside of marriage, 
abortion and contraception are freely available, and same-sex sexuality is 
accepted (and even embraced)—a culture where, when it comes to sex, 
“anything goes.”141 
On this account, the diminution of criminal law’s role in regulating sex 
and sexuality alongside the emergence of no-fault divorce seems especially 
significant. After all, divorce and criminal law were once especially forceful 
in meting out consequences to those who failed to comport with traditional 
sexual norms and mores that confined sex to heterosexual marriage and made 
marriage the normative ideal of adult intimate life. Through the criminal law, 
the state retained the ability to mark certain sexual conduct as bad––and just 
as importantly, to mark certain actors as sexually deviant.142 Likewise, fault-
based divorce regimes demanded that one spouse be identified as a 
wrongdoer in order to dissolve the marriage.143 The divorce regime imposed 
penalties on the wrongful spouse—adulterers could lose primary custody of 
their children or be subject to a less advantageous financial settlement upon 
divorce.144 In these “good old days,” one’s failure to observe traditional 
sexual mores incurred severe legal consequences. 
 
 140 See Catherine Powell, Up From Marriage: Freedom, Solitude, and Individual Autonomy in the 
Shadow of Marriage Equality, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 78 (2015) (discussing how Obergefell is 
“undoubtedly a victory deserving of celebration for the ways it moves freedom, autonomy, and equality 
forward”); David H. Gans, How Gay Marriage’s Triumph Could Protect Abortion Rights, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Jan. 6, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/127098/gay-marriages-triumph-protect-abortion-rights 
[https://perma.cc/ZEG4-72LF]. 
 141 Peter Berkowitz, Conservative Survival in a Progressive Age, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2012, 6:39 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324469304578144882157377760 [https:// 
perma.cc/Y4AM-VBBV]; Kristen Hatten, Abortion Doesn’t Exist in a Vacuum, LIVE ACTION (Feb. 22, 
2010, 5:41 PM), https://www.liveaction.org/news/abortion-doesnt-exist-in-a-vacuum [https://perma.cc/ 
NA8D-RJLQ]. 
 142 See Murray, supra note 15, at 607 (discussing criminal law’s historic twin aims with regard to the 
regulation of sex and sexuality: to punish those who deviated from the norm of marital sex and to express 
disapproval of nonmarital sex). 
 143 Typical fault-based divorce statutes allowed the dissolution of marriage on several grounds, 
including, most commonly, persistent physical or emotional abuse, abandonment, or adultery. See, e.g., 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1)-(4) (McKinney 2010). 
 144 Eskridge, supra note 67, at 1920 (discussing the many penalties the at-fault spouse historically 
faced in a divorce under a fault-based regime, including limitations on alimony, restrictions on property 
ownership, custody, and inheritance); Suzanne A. Kim, The Neutered Parent, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
1, 10–11 (2012) (noting that judges under fault-based regimes often denied custody to the spouse at fault, 
particularly in cases of adultery, preferring to grant custody to the innocent partner). 
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With this context in mind, it is unsurprising that many conservatives 
observe the changes that have taken place as effectively deregulating sex.145 
As they see it, the state is no longer interested in regulating and enforcing 
compliance with traditional sexual mores, a regulatory project that it once 
vigorously pursued. In this regard, what has occurred is not merely a sexual 
revolution but rather a kind of sexual anarchy in which the state has abdicated 
its traditional role of imposing consequences on those who did not comply 
with traditional sexual mores. On this telling, what has emerged from the 
debris of the sexual revolution is a culture of “sex without consequences.”146 
But critically, it is not just conservatives who are disappointed with the 
current state of sexual regulation and who view the current landscape as one 
in which there are no consequences for offensive sexual conduct. For 
progressives, the liberalization of sexual mores complements the changes in 
the regulation of rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment because both 
are viewed as promoting greater autonomy and equality in society.147 But 
despite this increased focus on rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment, 
many progressives feel that the state’s efforts to regulate are inadequate and 
anemic.148 As these dissenters see it, although there has been serious legal 
reform, it is mere window dressing because the state continues to neglect 
enforcement.149 Despite these reform efforts, they reason, rape and sexual 
 
 145 Through a variety of civil regimes—child custody determinations, professional codes of conduct, 
administrative regulations, and the expansion of civil marriage to new constituencies—the state continued 
to regulate private, consensual adult sex and sexuality quite robustly, even as the criminal law receded. 
See Murray, supra note 15, at 591–99, 614–15. However, this regulation may feel less thick and robust 
than the forms of regulation that once predominated. See Murray, supra note 113, at 53. 
 146 See Pokluda, supra note 12; see also Evan Lenow, More Than Women’s Health: Responsibility 
and Consequences in the Abortion Debate, COUNCIL ON BIBLICAL MANHOOD AND WOMANHOOD (July 
11, 2013), https://cbmw.org/topics/culture/more-than-womens-health-responsibility-and-consequences-
in-the-abortion-debate [https://perma.cc/Z2TB-W9JS]. 
 147 Indeed, Professor Aya Gruber argues that today, many associate “feminism” more with the 
punitive turn attending rape and sexual assault laws than they do with calls for access to abortion and 
reproductive rights. On this account, “[t]he zealous, well-groomed female prosecutor who throws the 
book at ‘sicko’ sex offenders has replaced the 1970s bra-burner as the icon of women’s empowerment.” 
Gruber, supra note 135, at 583. 
 148 See supra note 20. 
 149 See Baker, supra note 17, at 231–32 (“Despite all the reform, the criminal law does not appear to 
be actively punishing vast amounts of nonconsensual sex.”). 
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assault continue to be underreported,150 or often go unprosecuted151 because 
of concerns about the victim’s credibility or other barriers to prosecution and 
enforcement.152 Moreover, despite the changes in the law that have occurred, 
gendered norms around sex and sexuality have stubbornly persisted, making 
it difficult for these greater legal measures to gain traction.153 
Likewise, although many workplaces have created infrastructures for 
reporting and addressing sexual harassment, concerns about retaliation, 
victim-blaming, and “gray area” conduct that is offensive, though not 
necessarily prohibited,154 prevent many victims from filing complaints.155 
Those who do lodge successful complaints may find that the offenses—and 
the offenders—continue to be shielded from public scrutiny through legal 
settlements and nondisclosure agreements.156 As progressive dissenters see 
it, the law makes it challenging for victims to seek and achieve remedies for 
 
 150 See MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 
1994–2010, at 6 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9L2-
DRQ7] (finding that only 32% of sexual assaults against females were reported to the police in 2010); 
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 33 
(2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB62-2YM6] (“Only 19.1 
percent of the women and 12.9 percent of the men who were raped since their 18th birthday said their 
rape was reported to the police.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1155–57 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)) (discussing the underreporting of sexual assault). 
 151 Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2156 
(1995). 
 152 See Baker, supra note 17, at 235–45 (discussing the many hurdles rape victims face at trial). 
Critically, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the sexual assault “enforcement gap” is widest in cases pertaining 
to women of color, women in poverty, and LGBTQ victims, among others. Tuerkheimer, supra note 150, 
at 1155. 
 153 See Baker, supra note 17, at 247 (contending that rape reformers knew they had to fight against 
“entrenched norms in gendered scripts” governing public perceptions of sexual interactions between men 
and women); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 432–
33 (2016) (highlighting the “gender roles and stereotypes of masculine and feminine sexuality [and] . . . 
the hierarchically gendered social meanings and consequences of sexual victimization and perpetration” 
underlying rape and sexual assault). 
 154 See Conor Friedersdorf, How #MeToo Can Probe Gray Areas with Less Backlash, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/how-metoo-can-probe-
gray-areas-with-less-backlash/550559 [https://perma.cc/M8ZZ-F9PD] (discussing gray area conduct); 
Kathleen Kelley Reardon, It’s Not Always Clear What Constitutes Sexual Harassment. Use This Tool to 
Navigate the Gray Areas, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/06/its-not-always-clear-
what-constitutes-sexual-harassment-use-this-tool-to-navigate-the-gray-areas [https://perma.cc/ 
W6TD-SFHZ] (same). 
 155 See Estrich, supra note 10, at 833–34 (“Empirical studies suggest that possibly actionable 
harassment is widespread, even endemic, but the number of lawsuits, not surprisingly, does not bear out 
this possibility.”). 
 156 Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Workplace Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/legal-agreements-sexual-assault-
ndas/543252 [https://perma.cc/YS3A-G8TS]. 
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their injuries because it fails to provide adequate protection and redress.157 
On this account, the state has not gone far enough to address sexual 
harassment and sexual assault––indeed, it may seem as though there are few 
consequences for those who engage in this kind of offensive sexual 
conduct.158 
Although they are associated with divergent political perspectives and 
differ in both approach and long-term strategy, both the conservative and the 
progressive positions reflect a shared sense that the state has failed to 
articulate and enforce norms of appropriate sexual conduct. That is, these 
changes in the regulatory landscape have left the impression, at least for 
some, that the state has abdicated its regulatory role to articulate and enforce 
the bounds of sexual propriety and that this failure results in certain 
problematic sexual behaviors going unpunished. 
These two groups also recognize that the state’s departure has left the 
field open to new regulatory interventions. And these groups have come to 
the fore to fill the void. In doing so, these groups might be understood as 
engaging in the sort of private regulation that has always occurred but that 
has been overshadowed by the state’s more visible efforts to regulate sex and 
sexuality. Today, in view of the diminution in the state’s efforts to regulate 
sex and sexuality, these private regulatory actions are more visible than they 
have ever been—and, as the following Parts suggest, more consequential. 
Part IV considers private actors’ responses to these perceived state lapses, 
using Masterpiece Cakeshop and #MeToo as examples to illustrate the 
evolving regulatory phenomenon of private sexual regulation. Part V reflects 
on the implications of these more visible iterations of private sexual 
regulation. 
IV. PRIVATE ACTORS AS SEXUAL REGULATORS: MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 
AND #METOO 
For both conservatives and progressives, the current landscape of 
sexual regulation is shaped by the state’s failure to properly regulate and 
enforce what each group perceives as appropriate sexual norms. With this in 
mind, this Part considers how conservatives and progressives alike have 
responded to the state’s perceived failures. To do so, this Part focuses on two 
distinct developments—religious refusals and conscience exemption claims 
 
 157 See Lenora M. Lapidus, If Sexual Harassment Is Illegal, Why Is It So Rampant?, ACLU: SPEAK 
FREELY (Jan. 18, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-
workplace/if-sexual-harassment-illegal-why-it-so-rampant [https://perma.cc/ZET2-W3YS]. 
 158 Id. (arguing that, although sexual harassment has been legally prohibited for over two decades, it 
proliferates because women fear losing their jobs or going to trial, or cannot bring claims due to 
nondisclosure agreements or mandatory arbitration clauses). 
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of the sort sought in Masterpiece Cakeshop and the #MeToo movement’s 
efforts to surface and address sexual harassment and sexual assault in the 
workplace. To be clear, in juxtaposing these two responses, I do not mean to 
gloss over or minimize the very real differences in their approaches, 
animating principles, and goals. Nevertheless, as this Article argues, viewing 
in tandem these two efforts by private actors to articulate and enforce 
particular norms of sexual propriety provides a useful framework from which 
to consider the broader implications of this emergent form of sexual 
regulation. 
Section A provides an overview of Masterpiece Cakeshop, taking care 
to locate the request for religious refusals and conscience exemptions in the 
conservative response to sexual liberalization. Section B then turns to the 
#MeToo movement. This Section provides an overview of the #MeToo 
movement and its aims, and more importantly, contextualizes this 
development as a progressive response to the perceived failure of the state to 
properly regulate sexual harassment and sexual assault. 
A. Masterpiece Cakeshop 
In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins visited the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, to order a cake that would be served at a 
reception celebrating their marriage.159 However, when Jack Phillips, the 
owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, learned that the requested cake was 
intended for a party celebrating the couple’s Massachusetts wedding, he 
refused the couple’s business.160 As Phillips explained to Craig and Mullins, 
it would defy his religious convictions—which specified that marriage was 
a union between a man and a woman—to provide a cake for the purpose of 
celebrating a same-sex marriage.161 
On September 5, 2012, Craig and Mullins filed suit against Masterpiece 
Cakeshop with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, charging Phillips and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop with sexual orientation discrimination.162 Phillips 
countered the charges by arguing that he had not engaged in sexual 
orientation discrimination, as he was happy to serve gays and lesbians by 
providing cakes for other (nonmarital) occasions, such as birthdays and baby 
 
 159 Brief in Opposition at 2, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). Because same-sex couples were ineligible for civil marriage in Colorado, the 
couple planned to travel to Massachusetts to marry. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. The cake 
was intended for a reception that they would host for friends and family in Denver upon their return. Id. 
 160 Brief in Opposition, supra note 159, at 2–3. 
 161 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
 162 Joint Appendix at *47–53, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 
4232758. 
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showers.163 Over the course of four years, the dispute made its way through 
the Colorado administrative and state court systems, where Craig and 
Mullins prevailed.164 Phillips appealed the decision to the United States 
Supreme Court.165 At the Court, Phillips repackaged his claims and the 
attendant arguments. Rather than focusing squarely on the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act’s (CADA) nondiscrimination requirement as an 
imposition on his religious beliefs, he argued that the compliance with the 
Colorado antidiscrimination law constituted compelled speech.166 In a seven-
to-two decision, a majority of the Court ruled on narrow grounds that the 
Civil Rights Commission did not employ religious neutrality in its evaluation 
of Phillips’s claims, thus violating Jack Phillips’s free exercise rights, and 
reversed the Commission’s decision.167 Phillips is currently involved in 
another suit, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, after refusing to bake a 
blue and pink cake to celebrate an individual’s gender transition.168 After the 
refusal, the Colorado Civil Rights Division found that Phillips’s decision 
violated the CADA, and Phillips was ordered to participate in mandatory 
mediation.169 Phillips again brought suit against the Colorado Civil Rights 
Division, arguing, as he had with Craig and Mullins’s cake, that the custom 
gender transition cake “would have expressed messages” he felt he could not 
express due to his religious beliefs.170 The case is pending in Colorado district 
court. 
Although the Court did not rule on the broader question of the 
intersection of antidiscrimination laws, free exercise of religion, and freedom 
of speech,171 Masterpiece Cakeshop (and other religious exemption claims 
 
 163 Id. at *152. 
 164 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015), rev’d sub nom. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently declined to hear the 
case. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
 165 The Court heard oral arguments in the case on December 5, 2017. Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
 166 Id. at 4–10. 
 167 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–32, 1748. 
 168 Complaint at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074, 2018 WL 3870105 (D. 
Colo. Aug. 14, 2018). 
 169 Id. at 29. 
 170 Id. at 27. 
 171 Id. at 3. Despite the Court’s limited ruling, some conservatives nonetheless cast the decision as a 
win for religious liberty and free speech. Press Release, Concerned Women for America, Conservative 
Women Celebrate Freedom as the U.S. Supreme Court Decides Masterpiece Cakeshop (June 4, 2018), 
https://concernedwomen.org/conservative-women-celebrate-freedom-as-the-u-s-supreme-court-decides-
masterpiece-cakeshop [https://perma.cc/Y676-AQ66]; Rod Dreher, Religious Liberty Wins Small, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE (June 4, 2018, 11:36 AM), http://www. 
theamericanconservative.com/dreher/religious-liberty-wins-small-masterpiece-cakeshop [https://perma. 
cc/8TVR-GX33]. Conversely, many progressive organizations argued that the decision should be 
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like the one it surfaces) has almost uniformly been characterized as a 
collision between First Amendment values on the one hand and LGBTQ 
rights on the other—the classic juxtaposition of liberty and equality.172 This 
impulse is entirely understandable—on its face, the case surfaced the 
tensions between Jack Phillips’s religious convictions and free speech rights 
and Colorado’s commitment to antidiscrimination principles. 
But we might also view Masterpiece Cakeshop through the lens of 
sexual regulation—or more particularly, as a response to the state’s failure 
to enforce the sexual mores to which Phillips subscribed. At the heart of 
Phillips’s claim for an exemption from the CADA is the view that, by 
requiring him to sell a cake for use at a same-sex wedding reception, 
Colorado required Phillips to embrace something that contradicts his 
religious beliefs and, as he asserted at the Supreme Court, compelled him to 
reiterate Colorado’s pro-LGBTQ rights message.173 On this account, 
Phillips’s request for accommodation is a request to carve out a space of 
seclusion within the public sphere where he, and other believers, may dissent 
from the state’s embrace of same-sex marriage and other issues of LGBTQ 
equality.174 
As Phillips originally articulated his claim, the requested space of 
seclusion was space that the state, through an accommodation, would carve 
out—indeed, create—from the existing expanse of the public sphere. But one 
might argue that such a space need not be created at all because, in fact, it 
already exists as part of the regulatory landscape in which the state once 
clearly prescribed and enforced more traditional sexual mores.175 The space 
that Phillips sought to occupy was not a new space created in order to 
 
favorably read as continued protection for the rights of LGBTQ individuals because the Court did not 
provide businesses a right to discriminate. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission—FAQ, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/fact-sheet/masterpiece-cakeshop-v-colorado-civil-
rights-commission-faq [https://perma.cc/47TW-S4K2]. 
 172 Michael C. Dorf, Liberty and Equality Sometimes Require Tragic Choices, Just Not in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Dec. 12, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/12/ 
12/liberty-equality-sometimes-require-tragic-choices-just-not-masterpiece-cakeshop [https://perma.cc/ 
JB33-JGVC]; Garrett Epps, Using ‘Free Speech’ to Trump Civil Rights, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/whats-new-about-sessions-defense-of-
discrimination/547043 [https://perma.cc/T2WL-64F9]; Adam Liptak, Justices Sharply Divided in Gay 
Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/us/politics/supreme-
court-same-sex-marriage-cake.html [https://perma.cc/GE3N-W294]. 
 173 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 165, at 4. 
 174 Phillips’s opening brief to the Supreme Court expressed fears that laws like CADA would “crush 
those who hold unpopular views, pushing them from the public square.” Brief for Petitioners at 3, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 175 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2542–43 (discussing how religious objections are 
frequently made in connection with, and with encouragement from, political parties seeking a return to 
traditional sexual mores). 
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accommodate dissenting viewpoints. Rather, it is the very terrain on which 
the state once proscribed and punished—indeed, regulated—same-sex 
sexuality. 
Through this lens, we might view Phillips’s claim as not merely a 
request for an accommodation or carveout but rather as a bid to return to a 
time when antipathy for same-sex sexuality was clearly articulated and 
enforced.176 And while the state, because of antidiscrimination laws and other 
developments, is no longer in a position to articulate and enforce this vision 
of appropriate (heterosexual) sexual conduct, private actors, like Phillips, 
may, through accommodations and carveouts, assume this role. Accordingly, 
Phillips’s bid for accommodation might rightly be viewed as a bid to assume 
the regulatory space—and role—that the state once occupied and now has 
ostensibly abandoned.177 In this regard, Phillips’s request for accommodation 
is not simply about seeking space to dissent from the prevailing secular 
culture. Rather, we might understand it as an effort to reinstantiate and 
reinvigorate—albeit on a smaller scale—a regulatory culture in which 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage are less accepted and acceptable. 
At first blush, Phillips’s refusal to provide a wedding cake hardly seems 
regulatory. If anything, we might characterize it as an omission—a failure to 
provide the desired cake. But if one takes seriously the humiliation and injury 
that Craig and Mullins experienced upon being refused service, the 
regulatory posture of Phillips’s refusal becomes clear.178 
Historically, the state criminalized same-sex sexuality under sodomy 
prohibitions and made same-sex partners ineligible for marital recognition.179 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 See Melissa Murray, Loving’s Legacy: Decriminalization and the Regulation of Sex and 
Sexuality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2671, 2698–99 (2018) (contending that accommodations enable private 
actors to “express the kind of disapprobation and discrimination that the state itself is now unable to 
express”). 
 178 On this point, many briefs in support of Craig and Mullins cited or quoted Justice Arthur 
Goldberg’s concurrence in the landmark civil rights decision Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964). As Justice Goldberg wrote, “Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, 
hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely 
feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color.” Id. at 
292 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 (1964)); see, e.g., Brief of 211 
Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (quoting Justice Goldberg’s concurrence); Brief of the National Women’s Law 
Center and Other Groups as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6–7, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (same); Brief for Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) 
(same). 
 179 William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the 
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1339–43, 1347 (2000) (discussing the 
state’s use of criminal sodomy statutes in the twentieth century as a way to police homosexuals, who were 
painted as predatory or sexually deviant). 
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But, as discussed, the state no longer criminalizes consensual same-sex 
sodomy, same-sex marriage has been legalized across the country, and a 
number of states and localities have laws that protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination.180 These changes have profoundly altered the 
regulatory landscape insofar as homosexuality is concerned. Not only does 
the state no longer criminally punish same-sex intimacy, it has welcomed 
same-sex couples into the bosom of civic life.181 A group that the state once 
cast out as criminals and sexual deviants is now welcomed as part of the 
sexual mainstream.182 
With this context in mind, Phillips’s refusal and his request for an 
exemption from the CADA take on a more regulatory cast. In the face of the 
state’s embrace of gay couples, Phillips has drawn a line in the sand. By 
refusing to furnish a cake—and indeed, making clear that he is refusing 
because he does not wish to be complicit in something he views as sinful and 
wrong—Phillips is articulating his own vision of appropriate sexual conduct 
(one that does not brook homosexuality), and imposing consequences on the 
couple for their refusal to comply with these traditional heterosexual mores. 
Critically, the consequence is not merely the withholding of a cake; it is the 
withholding of the cake and the judgment that accompanies the refusal.183 If 
the state no longer punishes or penalizes same-sex sexuality, Jack Phillips 
will do so, making clear that he finds this conduct objectionable, even if the 
state does not. 
One could argue that the consequences Jack Phillips imposes on gay 
couples are minimal. He is one person. If he refuses to serve a gay couple, 
the couple can simply go to the next bakery, and the next, and so on.184 While 
 
 180 Twenty-one states, as well as the District of Columbia, prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity for both public and private employees. State Maps of Laws & Policies, 
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 11, 2018), https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment 
[https://perma.cc/M66X-2XE2]. 
 181 Indeed, after Obergefell, President Barack Obama celebrated the ruling for ending the “patchwork 
system” of regulation on same-sex marriage and called the decision a “victory for America” that 
“affirm[ed] what millions of Americans already believe in their hearts.” Transcript: Obama’s Remarks 
on Supreme Court Ruling on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/26/transcript-obamas-remarks-on-
supreme-court-ruling-on-same-sex-marriage [https://perma.cc/A2RD-NN53]. 
 182 In the context of the Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), striking Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation ban and thus permitting interracial marriage, Loving transformed interracial couples 
from “outlaws to in-laws,” formally sanctioning what had once been deviant––indeed, criminal––
behavior. Murray, supra note 15, at 580. 
 183 Professors NeJaime and Siegel write that these harms may be classified as both material (the 
withholding of the cake) and dignitary (the judgment attending the refusal). NeJaime & Siegel, supra 
note 22, at 2566–78. 
 184 Phillips himself raised this point to the Court, asking it to reject the “slippery-slope” argument 
raised by Craig and Mullins that granting Phillips an exemption would “open the floodgates to other 
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this is certainly true, it is worth noting that Phillips is not alone in refusing 
goods and services and seeking religious exemptions from the operation of 
antidiscrimination laws. In fact, claims of this sort have proliferated in recent 
years among those who furnish goods and services for weddings,185 as well 
as those who provide other services (or are in a position to provide such 
services), like dispensing contraception or performing abortions.186 And 
critically, although private actors like Phillips request religious 
accommodations as individuals, these requests are in fact part of a 
coordinated effort by religious liberty groups to test the limits of free exercise 
rights and, in the process, construct a network of accommodation structures 
that extend to all aspects of civil society––from the provision of wedding 
cakes to filling prescriptions for contraception.187 In short, we might 
understand these claims not as bespoke, individualized claims of religious 
liberty but rather as a coordinated effort to deploy principles of religious 
freedom for the purpose of recreating, accommodation by accommodation, 
an earlier epoch where sex was confined to heterosexual marriage and 
homosexuality was condemned.188 
In this vein, as a matter of sexual regulation, Masterpiece Cakeshop is 
not simply about Jack Phillips and his bakery. Instead, it is about the prospect 
of a thousand Jack Phillipses, armed with accommodation carveouts and the 
authority to refuse goods and services to avoid being complicit in “sin,” as 
well as the capacity to construct a broader network of refusals that functions 
collectively as an alternative regime of sexual regulation.189 
 
people of faith seeking similar freedom.” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 174, at 60; see also Brief of 
Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 32, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. 
v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (arguing that couples denied goods 
or services via religious exemptions can seek remedies by simply choosing another provider, while a 
provider forced to provide goods or services in violation of their religious beliefs must “repeatedly violate 
his conscience”). 
 185 Various wedding providers have brought religious exemption claims in an attempt to avoid 
servicing same-sex couples. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) 
(photographer); see also Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (florist), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.). 
 186 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2535, 2576–78 (discussing instances of conscience-
based refusals by purveyors of contraception, abortion, and wedding-related services). 
 187 See Sarah Posner, The Christian Legal Army Behind ‘Masterpiece Cakeshop,’ NATION (Nov. 28, 
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-christian-legal-army-behind-masterpiece-cakeshop 
[https://perma.cc/58TM-A2N6]. 
 188 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2556 (“[C]onscience provisions allow advocates to 
rework a traditional norm that was once enforced through the criminal law into a norm that is now 
enforced through a web of exemptions in the civil law.”). 
 189 See Brief of 211 Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 
178, at 16 (arguing that “discrimination under CADA would affect far more than cakeshops in Colorado” 
and “[e]xamples of how this exemption could operate to circumvent the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
abound”). 
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Viewing Masterpiece Cakeshop—and religious objections more 
generally—through the lens of sexual regulation not only helps contextualize 
the conservative response to the new regulatory landscape, it may also render 
legible the responses of those with different political commitments. The 
efforts of the #MeToo movement are instructive on this point. 
B. The #MeToo Movement 
In October 2017, in the wake of public revelations of sexual harassment 
and sexual assault allegations against Harvey Weinstein and other high-
profile men,190 the hashtag #MeToo spread virally across various social 
media platforms in an effort to demonstrate the widespread prevalence of 
these offenses, especially in the workplace.191 Initially intended as a means 
of cultivating empathy among young women for other victims of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault,192 the movement and its representative 
hashtag have come to represent the ubiquity of the offenses—and a society 
and legal culture that seem to condone the conduct.193 
 
 190 Jodi Kantor, Megan Twohey, and Ronan Farrow were widely credited for breaking stories 
detailing allegations of over two decades of sexual harassment and sexual assault committed by 
Weinstein. Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers 
Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:47 AM), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https:// 
perma.cc/7F5Q-RVZH]; Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment 
Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-
weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/PC64-YPMW]. More than eighty women have 
since come forward against Weinstein. Janice Williams, Harvey Weinstein Accusers: Over 80 Women 
Now Claim Producer Sexually Assaulted or Harassed Them, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 30, 2017, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/harvey-weinstein-accusers-sexual-assault-harassment-696485 [https:// 
perma.cc/MY24-YAYT]. In the months after the allegations against Weinstein emerged, many other 
high-profile men were also publicly fired or forced to resign after facing accusations of sexual harassment 
or assault. Almukhtar et al., supra note 33. 
 191 For a timeline tracing how #MeToo “went viral,” see Kara Fox & Jan Diehm, #MeToo’s Global 
Moment: The Anatomy of a Viral Campaign, CNN (Nov. 9, 2017, 1:35 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/world/metoo-hashtag-global-movement/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
HS7Z-VHDM]. 
 192 About, ME TOO, https://metoomvmt.org/about [https://perma.cc/E8BK-6PKQ]. 
 193 Mizrahi, supra note 10, at 133–37 (describing the failure of the law to protect against sexual 
harassment in the workplace); Nadia Khomami, #MeToo: How a Hashtag Became a Rallying Cry Against 
Sexual Harassment, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2017/oct/20/women-worldwide-use-hashtag-metoo-against-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/ 
3ZD2-Y64G] (highlighting the prevalence of sexual harassment and the resonance of the #MeToo 
movement); Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html [https://perma.cc/ 
94FM-NG6Z] (discussing how structural inequality, misogyny, and racism have “long paralyzed 
effective legal recourse for sexual harassment”); see also supra notes 150, 155–157 and accompanying 
text (noting that sexual assault is chronically underreported and rape laws are underenforced). 
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Critically, #MeToo’s goals go beyond simply highlighting the 
prevalence of these offenses; its stated purpose is to provide survivors with 
“pathways” for healing, while simultaneously “disrupt[ing] the systems that 
allow for the global proliferation of sexual violence.”194 #MeToo has 
spawned similar social justice-oriented organizations, including Time’s Up, 
a “solution-based, action-oriented next step in the [#MeToo] movement”195 
that focuses on passing legislation and changing policies to address the 
systemic sources of inequality—lack of representation, gendered pay 
disparities, and the unequal distribution of power—that cultivate the 
conditions in which sexual harassment and violence may occur.196 
To date, most commentary about #MeToo has focused on the 
movement’s grassroots origins and its use of social media as a platform for 
disseminating its messages.197 On this account, #MeToo’s obvious 
comparators are other social justice-oriented, progressive movements.198 But 
if we step back, we might glimpse surprising commonalities between 
#MeToo activists and conservatives claiming religious exemptions to 
antidiscrimination laws. Indeed, we might understand #MeToo as lodging a 
similar (though not identical) critique of the state and its failings and 
mounting a similar response. 
While much has been done to address longstanding blind spots in the 
law’s approach to sexual harassment and sexual assault, like the removal of 
the marital rape exemption199 and the revision of evidentiary rules related to 
the victim’s past sexual conduct,200 many progressives believe that there has 
 
 194 About, supra note 192. 
 195 Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the 2 
Movements—And How They’re Alike, TIME (published Mar. 8, 2018; updated Mar. 22, 2018, 5:21 PM), 
http://time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements 
[https://perma.cc/D4UW-D8DH]. 
 196 Id. In a recent article, Professor Vicki Schultz makes the point more concretely. As she argues, 
sex segregation in the workplace is a key factor in cultivating environments in which sexual harassment 
exists. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 49 (2018). 
 197 See, e.g., Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979 
[https://perma.cc/3GDH-PTSG]; Ohlheiser, supra note 24. 
 198 The Black Lives Matter movement, for one, has benefitted tremendously from the use of social 
media platforms, as on-the-ground activists have used Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other digital 
avenues to report on protests, mobilize support, and encourage public dialogue on police brutality. See 
Bijan Stephen, Social Media Helps Black Lives Matter Fight the Power, WIRED (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-power 
[https://perma.cc/9S57-B738]. The Occupy Wall Street movement also highlighted the power of social 
media to turn what began as a small protest into a large-scale initiative. See Jonathan Moyer, Political 
Activism on Social Media Has Grown Some Teeth, PAC. STANDARD (May 8, 2017), 
https://psmag.com/social-justice/social-media-activism [https://perma.cc/R5YU-VX78]. 
 199 Murray, Strange Bedfellows, supra note 110, at 1260–64. 
 200 Capers, supra note 8, at 843–47. 
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been too little progress in the effort to respond to and remedy the two 
offenses. The state’s inadequate efforts to properly enforce existing laws 
concerning these offenses has cultivated the conditions under which these—
and other—expressions of gender inequality may take root and flourish.201 
In this regard, #MeToo activists, like religious conservatives, have 
assessed the current landscape of sexual regulation and determined that the 
state’s anemic response to sexual harassment and sexual assault has given 
rise to a culture in which such conduct is endemic and condoned.202 Put 
differently, these progressives view the state as having abdicated its role in 
articulating and enforcing norms of appropriate sex and sexuality. And in 
response to the state’s failure, the #MeToo movement has attempted to 
correct these lapses. In so doing, they, like conservatives, have stepped into 
the regulatory void to advance an alternative set of sexual norms that sharply 
condemn and denounce harassment and assault and, more particularly, to 
impose consequences on those who do not comply with this vision of 
appropriate sex and sexuality. 
For example, deeply concerned that the mechanisms of legal 
settlements have allowed employers to “cover up” the past misdeeds of 
habitual offenders and to facilitate—even enable––a broader workplace 
culture of harassment and assault, #MeToo activists have used social media 
and crowdsourcing to create online “offender” registries.203 These 
 
 201 Donna Lenhoff, one of the architects of the Family and Medical Leave Act and a former civil 
rights adviser to President Obama, argues that current Title VII guidelines against workplace 
discrimination are “woefully inadequate” in addressing sexual harassment in the workplace and require 
significant reform, including abolishing forced arbitration and caps on damages. Donna Lenhoff, The 
#MeToo Movement Will Be in Vain if We Don’t Make These Changes, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-metoo-movement-will-be-in-vain-if-we-dont-make-
these-changes/2018/01/25/5add95a8-0090-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/UN84-DBZJ]. Professor Julie Goldscheid similarly argues that, although civil rights 
remedies are available to sexual assault victims, these remedies are insufficient because they do not 
extend to private individuals and often only reach employers, not those who actually committed the act 
of harassment or assault. Goldscheid, supra note 21. 
 202 Kantor, supra note 32 (“Harassment has flourished in part because structures intended to address 
it are broken: weak laws that fail to protect women, corporate policies that are narrowly drawn and secret 
settlements that silence women about abuses.”). 
 203 These registries include what was titled the “Shitty Media Men” list, a Google spreadsheet 
published by writer Moira Donegan one week after the accusations against Weinstein were made public. 
The list, which circulated rapidly through the media industry, was billed by its author as “a collection of 
misconduct rumors and allegations” and allowed readers to edit the list anonymously. Jaclyn Peiser, How 
a Crowdsourced List Set Off Months of #MeToo Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/business/media/media-men-list.html [https://perma.cc/WHA5-
7WT2]. Other crowdsourced lists have been published detailing sexual harassment incidents in academia, 
see Karen Kelsky, A Crowdsourced Survey of Sexual Harassment in the Academy, THE PROFESSOR IS IN 
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://theprofessorisin.com/2017/12/01/a-crowdsourced-survey-of-sexual-harassment-
in-the-academy [https://perma.cc/6X7D-N8CV], as well as naming student offenders on university 
campuses, see Molly Walsh, #HerToo: Middlebury Student in Trouble over List of Accused Sexual 
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crowdsourced documents allow individuals to anonymously identify those 
who have engaged in harassment and assault—often with particular attention 
paid to individuals who have been identified multiple times or have been 
accused of violent offenses.204 Critically, these registries serve multiple 
purposes. They allow victims an opportunity to name offenders without 
having to undertake the challenges—and indignities—of filing a complaint 
with their employer or the authorities.205 Further, by publicizing the identities 
of alleged harassers and workplaces that shelter them, the registries hope to 
improve transparency and information-sharing across various industries, 
ending the so-called “open secrets” or “whisper networks” that previously 
sought to alert employees to potential harassers.206 And in publicizing the 
identities of alleged harassers and their workplaces, activists hope to prod 
workplace management to take appropriate actions to cultivate a safer and 
more productive workplace culture.207 
As many commentators have noted, efforts like these crowdsourced 
registries pose their own problems. Some argue that the registries, which are 
often unvetted and allow users to anonymously add information, pose a range 
of due process concerns.208 Others argue that these efforts constitute a type 
of sexual “vigilantism” that may, if unchecked, have severe consequences.209 
These critiques are certainly valid. But the focus on these aspects of the 
#MeToo movement’s response to sexual harassment and sexual assault 
overlooks the regulatory posture of these efforts. Critically, these initiatives 
 
Transgressors, SEVEN DAYS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/ 
vermont/hertoo-student-in-trouble-over-list-of-accused-sexual-transgressors/Content?oid=12090461 
[https://perma.cc/2GBL-SE29]. 
 204 The “Shitty Media Men” list included the names of men accused of “physical sexual violence by 
multiple women,” highlighted in red. See Peiser, supra note 203. 
 205 See Moira Donegan, I Started the Media Men List: My Name is Moira Donegan, N.Y. MAG.: THE 
CUT (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/01/moira-donegan-i-started-the-media-men-list.html 
[https://perma.cc/CBX7-KAUK] (noting that the list was intended to provide “an alternate avenue” to 
report behavior and warn others without fear of retaliation). 
 206 See id. 
 207 Kelsky, supra note 203 (“My goal is for the academy as a whole to begin to grasp the true scope 
and scale of this problem in academic settings . . . , paving the way for more frank conversations and 
more effective interventions.”). 
 208 See Christina Cauterucci, Why It’s Reasonable to Feel a Queasy Mix of Emotions About the 
“Shitty Media Men” Spreadsheet, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
xx_factor/2017/10/12/why_it_s_reasonable_to_feel_a_queasy_mix_of_emotions_about_the_shitty_me
dia.html [https://perma.cc/2BJD-U52K]; Vidhi Doshi, After #MeToo, a Facebook List Names South 
Asian Academics. Some Say It’s a Step Too Far, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/31/after-metoo-a-facebook-list-names-south-asian-
academics-some-say-its-a-step-too-far [https://perma.cc/DK2R-Y9VL]. 
 209 See Wendy Kaminer, Beware Vigilante Feminism, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 27, 2017), https:// 
www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/10/27/beware-vigilante-feminism/Qix5RT3jJjoVIAzh9Zt9aM/ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/V3YF-DD2P]. 
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go beyond simply providing victims with an opportunity and forum to 
articulate their injuries and name the perpetrators. They allow individual 
private actors to assume an aspect of the regulatory role that the state has 
failed to undertake. Frustrated with the state’s efforts (or lack thereof) to deal 
with harassment and assault, individual actors are taking it upon themselves 
to launch private “prosecutions” via social media, traditional media, and 
other extralegal channels that seek to provide the victim with justice and 
redress by expelling the harasser from the workplace or community. In this 
regard, the #MeToo movement’s responses might be understood as part of a 
broader effort to occupy the regulatory space that the state has left vacant in 
order to articulate alternative norms of sexual propriety and to impose 
consequences on those who violate these norms. 
C. #MeToo and Masterpiece Cakeshop as Private Sexual Regulation 
Regulation, as I have defined it and it is often used, refers to efforts 
aimed at shaping and influencing behavior, whether through incentives like 
tax breaks and benefits or more coercive measures like legal prohibitions and 
punishment.210 While we typically associate regulatory power with the state, 
in fact, a wide range of entities, including private actors, might perform 
regulatory functions. As discussed in Part I, when private actors explicitly 
assume regulatory roles, they typically do so by virtue of a delegation of 
authority from a state actor. The notion of private actors independently 
regulating, without an explicit or implicit delegation of regulatory authority 
from the state, is rare (though not necessarily unprecedented).211 Still, as Part 
II makes clear, private actors may, through their own actions, assert a less 
visible regulatory role in order to complement—or in cases, challenge—the 
state’s regulatory agenda. 
I raise these points for two purposes. First, I raise them as a response to 
the impulse to deny the regulatory character of these two movements and 
their actions. There may be few precedents for #MeToo and Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, but make no mistake about it: both movements aim to vindicate 
their own view of appropriate sex and sexuality—and shape conduct to align 
 
 210 See supra Part I (discussing scholarly attempts to define and theorize regulation). 
 211 See supra Part I (detailing the traditional privatization structure, in which private actors are 
deputized by the state to achieve state goals); see also Joel Bakan, The Invisible Hand of Law: Private 
Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279, 281 (2015) (discussing examples of 
independent private regulation, including corporate social responsibility programs and cross-industry 
standards set by expert bodies like the International Organization for Standardization); Freeman, supra 
note 39, at 553 & nn.22–23 (noting that some trade associations and professional organizations have 
developed industry-wide self-regulatory regimes that parallel “traditional command-and-control 
regulation”). 
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with this view—by imposing consequences on those who deviate from these 
norms. In this regard, both movements are engaging in sexual regulation. 
Second, I wish to draw a distinction between privatization on the one 
hand and the notion of private sexual regulation on the other.212 Having 
rehearsed the standard definition of privatization in Part I, one might be 
inclined to observe that this arrangement does not exactly map the contours 
of religious exemptions and the efforts of the #MeToo movement. The 
standard account of privatization involves the state deputizing a private 
actor—usually a corporation or some other collective enterprise—to assume 
traditional state functions. And as importantly, when the private entity 
assumes those functions, it is not only at the state’s behest but rather with the 
state’s guidance as to how the functions can and should be performed.213 In 
this regard, privatization, despite the centrality of the private actor, is by its 
nature organized around the state’s normative agenda. 
By contrast, the efforts to privately regulate glimpsed in #MeToo and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop do not proceed from an obvious delegation of 
authority from the state.214 Nor do they involve an arrangement in which the 
state sets the tone for regulation by specifying the regulatory aims to be 
achieved, while the private actor complements and supports the state’s 
regulatory agenda through private action, as described in Section II.A. 
Rather than being state-centered, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the #MeToo 
movement involve private actors taking the lead in regulating and, indeed, 
in regulating in furtherance of their own normative agendas. 
In assuming the role of sexual regulators—and imposing consequences 
on those who violate particular norms—these private actors do not take their 
marching orders from the state, as in the traditional model of privatization.215 
Instead, they regulate in pursuit of a set of sexual norms that they themselves 
have articulated and hope to advance. And indeed, these norms are often in 
conflict with the sexual norms that the state has endorsed through law. 
Moreover, in regulating privately, the goal is not to simply effect the state’s 
regulatory agenda, but rather, to advance an entirely different normative 
vision—one that might rival the state’s for supremacy. 
 
 212 By “private sexual regulation,” I mean to indicate the regulation of sex and sexuality, including 
normative and nonnormative sex, by private actors. 
 213 See supra Part I (noting that in a traditional privatization model, the state sets the terms for the 
privatization arrangement). 
 214 However, some might argue that, in granting a religious accommodation or failing to check 
religious healthcare refusals, the state implicitly “delegates” authority to religious actors to discriminate 
in ways that the state is prohibited from doing. Likewise, some might argue that, in allowing the #MeToo 
movement to disregard norms of procedural fairness, the state tacitly condones these efforts in what might 
be understood as a public–private partnership. 
 215 See supra Part I (outlining traditional modes of privatization). 
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In this regard, Masterpiece Cakeshop and #MeToo suggest a distinct 
and highly visible form of private sexual regulation. The #MeToo movement 
is demanding a profound sea change in sexual culture, with private actors––
rather than the state––leading the charge.216 Masterpiece Cakeshop, for its 
part, is forging a similar path, attempting to utilize private actors to reinstate 
traditional norms of sex and sexuality that have since been displaced in favor 
of a more liberalized regime.217 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF #METOO AND MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S 
PRIVATE SEXUAL REGULATION 
As Part II explains, the fact of private regulation is not necessarily 
novel. Indeed, private actors have long played a role in regulation, whether 
as complements to the state’s regulatory efforts or through more limited 
regulatory interventions aimed at spurring the state to broader action in the 
public sphere. More critically, private actors may function as antagonists to 
the state—rejecting the state’s normative agenda. This context is important, 
as it renders legible the distinct regulatory interventions of the #MeToo 
movement and religious conservatives seeking accommodations. 
Both the #MeToo movement and Masterpiece Cakeshop are instances 
of private actors challenging the state’s normative regime for the regulation 
of sex and sexuality. However, these two efforts differ meaningfully from 
the ways that private actors previously have sought to challenge the state’s 
regulatory agenda. The Sections that follow attempt to parse these 
differences while considering the implications of these new iterations of 
private regulation. 
A. #MeToo: Engaging the State 
In the year since it first emerged as a vehicle of private sexual 
regulation, the #MeToo movement has been heralded for its innovative use 
of social media, particularly in light of the inadequacy of traditional methods 
 
 216 #MeToo has already seen success on this front, as more than 100 state bills related to workplace 
harassment have been announced during the 2018 legislative session. Amber Phillips, While Congress 
Stalls, States Are Actually Doing Something About Sexual Harassment, WASH. POST: FIX (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/06/while-congress-stalls-states-are-actually-
doing-something-about-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/5KMM-ESWU]. 
 217 The Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF), the Christian advocacy organization that represented 
Phillips in Masterpiece Cakeshop and many other organizations in conscience-exemption claims, has 
stated that its long-term goal is to “change the culture” to “reverse[] the corrosive tide of censorship 
against Christians” resulting from the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws against religious actors. 
Who We Are, ADF, https://www.adflegal.org/about-us/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/6UHU-YPR6]; see 
also ADF, WHAT DOES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM MEAN TO YOU? 6, 8 (2016), 
https://adflegal.blob.core.windows.net/mainsite-new/docs/default-source/documents/resources/about-
us-resources/who-we-are/adf_signaturebrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE7Z-YPSK]. 
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of legal enforcement and redress.218 But despite these innovative aspects, the 
#MeToo movement is, in fact, actually quite traditional in its approach to 
regulation and its relationship to the state––even more so than Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, as I note below. 
Like the religious objectors in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the progressive 
activists of the #MeToo movement have stepped in to privately regulate in 
the state’s stead. But even as it takes on the project of privately regulating 
sexual harassment and sexual assault in the workplace, #MeToo has 
positioned itself in a way that at once challenges the state and seeks to engage 
with the state in order to yield substantive reforms. Put more directly, it 
simultaneously rejects the state’s attempts to remedy sexual harassment and 
sexual assault as ineffective while working to spur the state to action to 
correct––and strengthen––these initiatives. 
In this regard, the #MeToo movement may in part sound in the register 
of the corporations who provided same-sex domestic partnership benefits in 
the period before marriage equality, and who currently provide paid leave 
policies absent government regulation requiring them to do so. But the 
private actions of the #MeToo movement go beyond the cultivation model 
glimpsed in the same-sex marriage debate. Rather than simply providing a 
template for action that the state might adopt going forward and passively 
avoiding direct engagement with the state, activists associated with the 
#MeToo movement have explicitly stated that the movement’s goals involve 
engaging the state in a broader conversation about appropriate conduct in the 
workplace and the state’s role in ensuring safe spaces for women and other 
vulnerable groups.219 On this account, the #MeToo movement’s actions are 
not simply about usurping the state’s regulatory role and imposing 
consequences on those who have failed to comply with the movement’s 
understanding of appropriate sexual conduct. Instead, the larger goal is to 
persuade the state to adopt this vision of appropriate sex and sexuality and 
use it to undergird more progressive and egalitarian laws and policies.220 
Accordingly, the #MeToo movement’s posture vis-à-vis the state is 
somewhat different from that of corporations that began offering domestic 
 
 218 See Abby Ohlheiser, How #MeToo Really Was Different, According to Data, WASH. POST (Jan. 
22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2018/01/22/how-metoo-really-was-
different-according-to-data [https://perma.cc/8YWW-LPPP]. 
 219 See About Time’s Up, TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/about_times_up 
[https://perma.cc/Z4ES-HU69] (stating the initiative’s goals are to “partner with leading advocates for 
equality and safety to improve laws, employment agreements and corporate policies . . . and enable more 
women and men to access our legal system to hold wrongdoers accountable”). 
 220 About, supra note 192 (noting that some of the movement’s aims are to “disrupt the systems that 
allow for the global proliferation of sexual violence” as well as to “reframe and expand the global 
conversation around sexual violence to speak to the needs of a broader spectrum of survivors”). 
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partnership benefits or paid leave programs. Armed with considerable social 
and financial capital, the corporations were in a position to offer employees 
some measure of workplace equity and, in so doing, to facilitate an ongoing 
conversation about LGBTQ equality and same-sex marriage or the 
importance of providing employees leave to care for newborn children.221 
But these corporations did not set out with the intention of engaging or 
persuading the state to legalize same-sex marriage or enact public leave 
policies.222 Their own relative market power allowed them to be able to shape 
workplace norms within the private sphere. Over time, their actions, in 
tandem with public efforts to expand public domestic partnership registries 
and benefits at the state and municipal levels, eventually helped tip the 
balance in favor of same-sex marriage.223 
By contrast, while the #MeToo movement has harnessed the power and 
potential of social media and public opinion, it lacks the market power and 
capital that these corporations were able to bring to bear on the issue of 
LGBTQ equality. That is, unlike the corporations, which could continue to 
cultivate pockets of LGBTQ equality within their private workplaces, the 
#MeToo movement likely cannot achieve the broader impact it seeks 
independently.224 While it has been effective at rooting out offenders, 
#MeToo has been unwieldy and subject to myriad criticism even from within 
its ranks.225 And indeed, at some point, the criticisms of #MeToo—concerns 
 
 221 See Cadei, supra note 77 (discussing how corporations’ moves to act on social issues have 
“ma[de] the business community the sort of ‘big tent’ political force that neither major political party can 
claim to be”). 
 222 See Phil Wahba, From Walmart to J.C. Penney, Retail Reflect Shifting U.S. Views on Gay Rights, 
FORTUNE (June 26, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/26/retailers-gay-rights-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/D9GK-KBRE] (arguing that, even if businesses did not sincerely want to support the 
gay rights effort, there was sufficient financial incentive to support them, including wooing millennial 
consumers and attracting talent). 
 223 See Katie Lobosco, How Businesses Rallied for Same-Sex Marriage, CNN MONEY (June 26, 
2015, 6:56 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/06/26/news/companies/same-sex-marriage-business/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/C2MH-NSVK]; Socarides, supra note 77. 
 224 See Marci A. Hamilton, Seven Changes That Would Empower the #MeToo Movement, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/seven-changes-would-empower-
metoo-movement-722283 [https://perma.cc/VS5P-4Z2J] (arguing that, while publicly shaming offenders 
is an effective short-term mechanism, long-term change cannot be achieved without disrupting the power 
structure in place that enabled offenders through legal reform); Rafia Zakaria, The Legal System Needs 
to Catch Up with the #MeToo Movement, NATION (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-legal-system-needs-to-catch-up-with-the-metoo-movement 
[https://perma.cc/MD2R-VF69] (contending that #MeToo can only go beyond affecting powerful 
perpetrators to reach the “ordinary harasser and the ordinary harassed” if it spurs legislative action). 
 225 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, #MeToo Excesses, HARV. CRIMSON (Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/1/16/bartholet-metoo-excesses [https://perma.cc/BYG8-
4AR4]; Masha Gessen, When Does a Watershed Become a Sex Panic?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/when-does-a-watershed-become-a-sex-panic 
[https://perma.cc/6ZWL-NSMS]; Daphne Merkin, Publicly, We Say #MeToo. Privately, We Have 
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about due process and vigilantism—may make this kind of extralegal 
regulation unsustainable in the long term. Unlike a corporation armed with 
the market power and clout to create and maintain a zone of private 
regulation as long as it wishes, #MeToo cannot maintain indefinitely the 
private regulatory zone it has created through its assumption of the state’s 
regulatory role and its use of social media platforms.226 To advance its vision 
of appropriate sex and sexuality and to achieve meaningful change, #MeToo 
must engage the state. And indeed, those who have led the movement and its 
related initiatives have from the beginning been upfront about the need—and 
desire—to engage the state in a broader program of reform.227 Thus, while 
#MeToo is not the first iteration of private actors seeking to regulate in 
furtherance of a new normative agenda, it is perhaps distinct in its desire—
and need—to engage the state in an ongoing dialogue about regulating 
appropriate sexual conduct. 
This insight not only distinguishes #MeToo from other efforts to 
cultivate new sexual norms, it also illuminates a striking difference between 
 
Misgivings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/golden-globes-
metoo.html [https://perma.cc/UKD6-CHLN]; Valeriya Safronova, Catherine Deneuve and Others 
Denounce the #MeToo Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/ 
movies/catherine-deneuve-and-others-denounce-the-metoo-movement.html [https://perma.cc/2BAY-
G7QN]; Andrew Sullivan, It’s Time to Resist the Excesses of #MeToo, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 
12, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/andrew-sullivan-time-to-resist-excesses-of-
metoo.html [https://perma.cc/2XFY-NNKE]; Emily Yoffe, Why the #MeToo Movement Should Be Ready 
for a Backlash, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/10/ 
yoffe-sexual-harassment-college-franken-216057 [https://perma.cc/7U9M-AMM2]. 
 226 See Joan C. Williams & Suzanne Lebsock, Now What?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/cover-story/2018/01/now-what [https://perma.cc/6EUX-WGKY] (“Translating outrage 
into action, however, requires moving beyond hashtags toward new norms of workplace conduct.”). 
 227 During a discussion about the future of the #MeToo movement, founder Tarana Burke told 
National Women’s Law Center President and CEO Fatima Goss Graves, “We need laws and policies . . . . 
[W]e need people who are thinking about that all the time.” National Women’s Law Center, FACEBOOK 
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/nwlc/videos/10155948672379313 [https://perma.cc/B9RS-
6CY7]; see also Charlotte Alter, ‘Every Woman Has a Story.’ How Women Are Turning Their Rage into 
Political Action, TIME (Oct. 29, 2017), http://time.com/5001824/me-too-womens-convention 
[https://perma.cc/2KF2-GWYQ] (positing that anger over the pervasive sexual harassment and sexual 
assault exposed by the #MeToo movement was “propelling women into civic engagement in 
unprecedented numbers”); Ashley Lisenby, #MeToo Founder Talks the Future of the Movement at 
Webster University Lecture, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Feb. 20, 2018), 
http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/metoo-founder-talks-future-movement-webster-university-lecture 
[https://perma.cc/7HP2-7LS8] (noting that Tarana Burke saw legislation and policy change as goals of 
the #MeToo movement); Chris Snyder & Linette Lopez, Tarana Burke on Why She Created the #MeToo 
Movement—And Where It’s Headed, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2017 10:16 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-metoo-movement-started-where-its-headed-tarana-burke-
time-person-of-year-women-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/VB9L-DCUL] (“The #MeToo Congress bill gets 
rid of the forced, 90-day cooling-off period that people who work on Capitol Hill have to have before 
they can file a sexual harassment claim. When that’s passed, that will set a precedent, hopefully, for the 
country.”). 
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#MeToo and Masterpiece Cakeshop. For although these two movements are 
similar in their efforts to privately regulate in furtherance of their own vision 
of appropriate sex and sexuality, they differ substantially in the ways in 
which they engage with the state. The Section that follows takes up this 
thread in its discussion of Masterpiece Cakeshop. 
B. Masterpiece Cakeshop: Displacing the State 
While the #MeToo movement has been explicit about its desire to 
engage the state, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the conservatives who seek 
religious accommodations appear less interested in fostering a dialogue with 
the state about appropriate sexual norms.228 
This indifference to the state is perhaps unsurprising. The liberalization 
of sexual culture makes clear that conservatives have lost ground in terms of 
their ability to vindicate their vision of traditional sexuality through 
majoritarian politics.229 Instead, the majority hews to a more secular vision 
and, accordingly, has refashioned the state’s regulatory efforts in favor of a 
more liberalized sexual culture.230 
This shift helps contextualize conservatives’ posture toward the state 
and the approach that they use in seeking religious accommodations.231 As 
Professors Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel explain, religious actors like 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Jack Phillips have two options for challenging the 
cultural and social shifts to which they object. On the one hand, Phillips and 
other “[r]eligious actors can evangelize by advocating for laws on abortion 
 
 228 Indeed, both Phillips himself and the ADF have publicly positioned Phillips as a target of state 
persecution. See Maureen Collins, 3 Myths About the Masterpiece Cakeshop Ruling Debunked, ADF 
(June 15, 2018), http://www.adflegal.org/detailspages/blog-details/allianceedge/2018/06/15/3-myths-
about-the-masterpiece-cakeshop-ruling-debunked [https://perma.cc/Z2YL-JPGN] (“This time the 
government has gone too far; we will not stand idly by while people of faith are targeted by the very 
government that is supposed to be protecting their freedoms.”); see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 
174, at 3 (arguing that “the Commission punished [Phillips], demeaned his beliefs, and marginalized his 
place in the community”). 
 229 Laura Turner, What Happens When the ‘Moral Majority’ Becomes a Minority?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/end-of-moral-majority/407359 
[https://perma.cc/N8TE-KXWP]. 
 230 See Frank Newport, Americans Continue to Shift Left on Key Moral Issues, GALLUP (May 26, 
2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183413/americans-continue-shift-left-key-moral-issues.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3UYU-43LB] (noting the current surging and in some cases record-high moral approval 
among Americans of many types of progressive sexual conduct, including same-sex relationships, 
divorce, and sex between unmarried partners). We might understand the events of the last sixty years not 
simply as an issue of the state abdicating its traditional role in regulating sex and sexuality but rather 
regulating in furtherance of a different normative agenda, one that favors sexual privacy (and a more 
limited role for the state) and LGBTQ equality. 
 231 See Turner, supra note 229. 
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or marriage that conform to traditional and religious values.”232 That is, using 
the democratic process, they can try to cobble together a majority to reinstate 
their more traditional view of sex and sexuality. Of course, it may be 
increasingly difficult for religious conservatives to harness the majority 
needed to roll back the cultural changes that have unfolded over the last sixty 
years. 
According to Professors NeJaime and Siegel, recognizing that they will 
likely be unsuccessful—at least in the short term—in pressing for a 
legislative return to a more traditional sexual culture, religious conservatives 
have instead pursued a different path—to “evangelize by seeking religious 
exemptions from laws of general application that they believe contravene 
traditional and religious values.”233 Put differently, “[w]ithout change in 
numbers or belief, religious actors can shift from speaking as a majority 
seeking to enforce traditional morality to speaking as a minority seeking 
exemptions from laws that offend traditional morality.”234 
With this in mind, religious conservatives have no incentive to dialogue 
with the state. The state’s normative agenda reflects a new majority of which 
they are not a part. And because the state does not support their preferred 
normative agenda, religious conservatives have instead framed their request 
to the state in more minimal terms. Unlikely to see the state enforce its 
preferred regulatory agenda, these conservatives simply ask that the state 
carve out space for them to exercise their religious beliefs in a limited 
(private) context.235 
But recall that the space that these conservatives seek is not new space. 
Indeed, it is part of the existing terrain that the state once regulated in the 
context of sex and sexuality—that is, a piece of the public sphere. 
Reconceptualized in this way, conservatives’ request for an accommodation 
is a request for the state to cede a portion of the public sphere to these private 
actors who may subsequently recharacterize that space as a private zone 
suitable for imposing and enforcing their own regulatory agendas. 
In this regard, the request for religious accommodation sounds in the 
register of the responses to Buchanan v. Warley and Brown v. Board of 
Education, where white Southerners resisted the mandate to integrate by 
appealing to the private sphere—restrictive covenants that prevented 
property from being sold to minorities and the creation of private 
 
 232 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2552. 
 233 Id. at 2552–53. 
 234 Id. at 2553. 
 235 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 174, at 3 (arguing that the case centered on “Phillips’s freedom 
to part ways with the current majority view on marriage and to create his wedding cakes consistently with 
his ‘decent and honorable’ religious beliefs”). 
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“segregation academies” intended as refuges for white students fleeing 
integrated public schools.236 And as with restrictive covenants and 
“segregation academies,” where Southerners’ resistance to integration 
engaged the state only passively—through judicial enforcement of restrictive 
covenants and subsidization of segregation academies as tax exempt 
nonprofits237—religious conservatives do not require the state’s active 
engagement in the effort to reentrench traditional sexual mores. All that they 
require to reinstate their favored vision of traditional sexual mores is the 
state’s “accommodation.”238 
When viewed through this historical lens, the implications of religious 
accommodations seem more obvious—and more troubling. The grant of an 
accommodation is essentially the recharacterization of public space, where 
the state and its laws hold sway, into private space, where private actors may 
regulate their own vision of appropriate sex and sexuality. It is this 
transmutation of the public sphere into private space that allows the private 
actor’s vision of appropriate sexuality to be vindicated—even over the 
majority’s preference for more liberalized sexual norms.239 
And meaningfully, in the contemporary context of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, it remains to be seen whether the state will resist these efforts to 
expand the private sphere, as the federal government did during the Civil 
 
 236 See supra Section IV.C (discussing how private actors have historically challenged the state). The 
fact that the request for religious accommodation sounds in the register of past resistance to residential 
and school integration suggests the degree to which private regulation is often deployed to resist civil 
rights progress. I do not wish to minimize these commonalities, as I think they are vitally important for 
understanding the changing dynamics of sexual regulation. Indeed, in calling attention to this common 
response across distinct issue areas, I hope to make clear that issues of sex and sexuality are part of the 
ongoing struggle for civil rights—and should be understood as such—even if these issues are often 
viewed as distinct from more traditional civil rights fare. 
 237 See id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, 
Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 675–77 (2011) (discussing 
the ways religious fundamentalists attempted to persuade the government to give segregation academies 
tax-exempt status); Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw 
County, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6–8 (1992) (discussing various ways the state supported segregation 
academies). 
 238 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 174, at 14 (framing the issue as “[Phillips] seek[ing] to live 
his life, pursue his profession, and craft his art consistently with his religious identity” away from 
governmental compulsion to act counter to his beliefs). Prominent religious organizations have also taken 
pains to frame these accommodations as minor intrusions on public life. See, e.g., Mark David Hall, 
Religious Accommodations and the Common Good, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.heritage.org/civil-society/report/religious-accommodations-and-the-common-good [https:// 
perma.cc/Y9ZC-2D7N] (“[T]here is little evidence that . . . accommodations have harmed other 
individuals or kept either the states or the nation from meeting significant policy objectives.”). 
 239 Newport, supra note 230; see Turner, supra note 229. 
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Rights Movement.240 With the state’s role uncertain, this recasting of public 
space into private space portends the reclamation of the public sphere by 
private actors. As noted earlier, the threat that lies at the heart of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop is the threat of aggregation.241 By himself, Jack Phillips is merely 
one baker who refuses to bake cakes for same-sex weddings. For some, 
Phillips’s refusal is discomfiting but not necessarily alarming in the way of 
some more egregious and overt act of discrimination—say, for example, the 
burning of a cross in an African American’s front yard.242 However, the 
danger is not in Jack Phillips’s individual refusal taken alone. A thousand 
Jack Phillipses armed with religious accommodations have the potential to 
create a network of refusals that would make it virtually impossible for 
LGBTQ persons to plan a wedding or, indeed, to participate in many 
quotidian aspects of public life.243 
Of course, some might argue that this kind of aggregation is less 
alarming because these accommodations are sought by individuals, and in 
this regard, they each may have a bespoke quality that defies the threats that 
aggregation poses.244 While this might be true in the abstract, in practice, 
 
 240 As discussed in Section II.C, supra, during the Civil Rights Movement, the federal government 
rebuked efforts to expand the private sphere for private discrimination in defiance of state-endorsed norms 
of equality. Through the imposition—and defense—of antidiscrimination statutes and a refusal to enforce 
racially restrictive covenants, the federal government resisted efforts to undermine the new public norms 
of integration and equality. 
 241 See supra Section III.A (discussing how religious exemptions may work in concert to create a 
network of refusals). 
 242 In Virginia v. Black, members of the Ku Klux Klan, who had burned a cross in the yard of a black 
neighbor, challenged Virginia’s cross-burning statute on First Amendment grounds. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
The Court found that, while statutes banning cross burning may be permissible under the First 
Amendment, the Virginia statute was facially unconstitutional because it presumed that burning a cross 
in public view was prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate. Id. at 367. 
 243 See Brief for the Central Conference of American Rabbis et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) 
(No. 16-111) (arguing that if “something as attenuated from actual religious observance as a cake sold by 
a bakery open to the public may trigger an exemption from neutral enforcement of a public 
accommodation law, surely florists, caterers, venue owners, and invitation printers . . . will assert their 
own right to a constitutional exemption”); see also Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8–9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(No. 16-111) (identifying over a thousand instances in which LGBTQ individuals had experienced 
discrimination in public accommodations). 
 244 See Brief of Concerned Women for America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–5, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing that market forces, including 
overwhelming public support for LGBTQ rights, would prevent religious exemptions from having 
aggregate anti-LGBTQ effect); Brief of Law and Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 22, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (same); Brief of Mark Regnerus 
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) 
(contending that individual conscience exemptions would not “open[] the door to widespread 
discriminatory acts”). 
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these requests for accommodation are not individual in the strictest sense but 
rather are part of a coordinated social movement aimed at securing space for 
the faithful to object to a range of widely accepted sexual practices from 
contraception to abortion to same-sex marriage.245 The aggregative effect of 
religious accommodation is to shrink the public sphere—and the domain of 
state-endorsed laws and norms—while expanding the private sphere and the 
authority of private actors who operate outside of the state’s reach.246 
In this regard, Masterpiece Cakeshop presents a very different approach 
to engaging the state than does #MeToo. To the extent the #MeToo 
movement has usurped the state’s regulatory role—and the space in which 
that role is exercised—its colonization is understood as temporary and finite. 
In time, #MeToo explicitly contemplates returning its regulatory authority 
and terrain to the state, which will again take the lead in regulating sexual 
harassment and sexual assault, ideally with a normative agenda that bears 
#MeToo’s imprimatur. 
By contrast, religious conservatives appear less concerned with 
relinquishing regulatory authority and terrain back to the state, or at least, 
they appear less publicly concerned about the state taking the lead in such a 
 
 245 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2548–52. 
 246 Some scholars view the interplay between religious accommodations and the public/private 
divide in ways that are distinct, but nonetheless related, to the view I offer here. As Professor Joseph 
Singer argues, litigation of the sort seen in Masterpiece Cakeshop is an attempt to unsettle—and contest—
the public understanding of markets that emerged in the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Joseph 
William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 
95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 930–32 (2015) (noting that the arguments used by segregationists to exclude 
customers before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have “been revived by businesses seeking 
to deny services to LGBT customers”); see also Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public 
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1293 (1996) (“In 1964, it was still 
plausible to argue that businesses had a right to exclude African-American customers simply because the 
businesses were property owners and because one of the rights associated with property was the right to 
exclude. Today in 1996, this argument is no longer acceptable . . . .”). Likewise, Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel argue that Masterpiece Cakeshop represents an effort to reinvigorate and reintegrate religion in the 
public sphere. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201, 213 & n.52–53 (2018). These views are not inconsistent 
with my view that Masterpiece Cakeshop—and religious accommodations more generally—are an 
attempt to recast portions of the public sphere as private space. All three understandings underscore the 
tension between private property, markets, and public accommodations law. See, e.g., Freeman, supra 
note 39, at 564 & n.81 (“Critical legal scholars, building on legal realism, successfully exposed the 
incoherence of the public/private divide, revealing that a purely private realm exists only as a legal 
construct.”); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN L. REV. 1, 13 
(1991) (“The familiarity of the public-private distinction obscures the contingent and political character 
of the initial designation, and subsequent challenges to the subordinating effects of such a ‘neutral’ 
distinction are then criticized as ‘political.’”); Kay, supra note 46, at 334 (“The overwhelming weight of 
published academic opinion has rejected the premise that legal doctrine can rest on a supposed distinction 
between public and private actions. Even in conduct in which no state official participates, it is possible 
to discern some decision of the state.”). 
113:825 (2019) Consequential Sex 
881 
handover. This is not to say that religious conservatives are not interested in 
effecting normative changes in the public sphere. Indeed, they have made 
clear in the context of abortion that religious accommodations are part of a 
multi-pronged effort to roll back Roe v. Wade––and to return to the pre-1973 
status quo where abortion was criminally proscribed throughout the United 
States.247 With this in mind, religious accommodations aimed at same-sex 
marriages and LGBTQ rights might well be part of a broader effort to 
undermine Obergefell v. Hodges and Lawrence v. Texas, the two Supreme 
Court decisions that legalized same-sex marriage and decriminalized same-
sex sexual conduct, respectively.248 
Rather, when I suggest that religious conservatives appear less 
concerned with relinquishing regulatory authority and terrain back to the 
state, I mean only that, unless and until overturning Obergefell and Lawrence 
seems both possible and imminent, private regulation can effectively provide 
conservatives with the substantive outcome that they seek—a diminished 
public sphere and the opportunity to impose their vision of appropriate sex 
and sexuality on others in a more expansive private sphere.249 By facilitating 
private sexual regulation, state-granted religious accommodations have the 
potential to undermine not only antidiscrimination laws but also an entire 
public apparatus structured to vindicate public values of liberty and equality. 
This is all to say that while #MeToo and Masterpiece Cakeshop both 
illustrate the power of private sexual regulation, they do so in strikingly 
different ways. #MeToo sees the state as a necessary, if recalcitrant, partner 
in its efforts to combat sexual harassment and sexual assault and to cultivate 
a more progressive sexual culture. Its usurpation of the state’s regulatory role 
and ambit is in furtherance of this dialogical mission. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
by contrast, does not explicitly seek a partnership with the state. But in 
providing accommodations—and in so doing, facilitating the diminution of 
 
 247 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2535–39; see also Refusing to Provide Health Services, 
GUTTMACHER INST.: STATE LAWS & POL’YS, https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/ 
refusing-provide-health-services [https://perma.cc/F2GA-WJUL] (highlighting the “patchwork of federal 
laws” that explicitly allow health care providers to refuse to provide abortion-related care to patients). 
 248 See Louise Melling, Will Obergefell Be the New Roe?, SLATE (June 5, 2018, 1:41 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/the-masterpiece-cakeshop-decision-will-not-deter-
opponents-of-lgbt-equality.html [https://perma.cc/5SCN-FQZA]; supra note 107; see also RYAN T. 
ANDERSON ET AL., DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 112–13 (2017) (arguing that 
“the law after Obergefell should treat those who believe that marriage unites man and woman . . . as it 
has treated prolife hospitals, doctors, and others in the wake of Roe v. Wade”). 
 249 Indeed, prominent Christian conservatives have said that a direct challenge to Obergefell is likely 
several years away, while a facial challenge to abortion rights under Roe may come sooner. See Liam 
Stack & Elizabeth Dias, Why the Supreme Court Opening Could Affect Gay Marriage As Well As 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/us/politics/gay-marriage-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/U7CA-SBB9] (quoting Mathew Staver, chairman of the 
conservative Liberty Counsel). 
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the public sphere and the expansion of the private sphere—the state is 
functioning, however unwittingly, as a crucial partner in the effort to 
reinstate the traditional sexual mores that held sway a generation ago. 
CONCLUSION 
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still 
vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the 
public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is 
itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who 
compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which 
it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does 
execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of 
right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, 
it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of 
political oppression . . . . 
—John Stuart Mill, On Liberty250 
In his 1859 book On Liberty, John Stuart Mill warned of the “tyranny 
of the majority.”251 As Mill explained, democracy’s inherent weakness was 
the capacity of the majority to impose its will and, in the process, subjugate 
minority voices.252 Critically, Mill’s understanding of the tyranny of the 
majority was not limited to the will of people expressed through state action. 
Mill recognized that, in addition to the acts done by “the hands of its political 
functionaries,” individuals were well equipped to “execute [their] own 
mandates.”253 
Though Mill spoke collectively of the “majority,” his warning 
contemplated individual private actors—“the separate individuals who 
compose [society]”254—and the dangers of private action—“despotism of 
custom”255—aimed at regulating the conduct of others. As Mill observed, in 
acting independently to pursue their own mandates, individuals might 
engage in a kind of regulatory activity “more formidable” than anything the 
state might devise.256 For Mill, the threat of private action lay in its subtlety 
and invidiousness. Unlike the actions of the state, private action could be 
difficult to avoid and, indeed, “penetrat[ed] much more deeply into the 
details of life, enslaving the soul itself.”257 
 
 250 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (2d ed. 1859). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 126. 
 256 Id. at 13. 
 257 Id. 
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In many ways, Mill’s observations are prescient. We live in a time 
where private actors exercise significant regulatory power. Technological 
innovations, like the development of social media, a proliferating meme 
culture, and the widespread availability of the Internet, have allowed 
individuals and organizations alike to quickly galvanize support and 
advocate for new normative agendas.258  
Despite the rise of private actors wielding considerable authority in 
shaping behavior and norms—regulating—there has been very little effort to 
map and theorize these developments and consider their consequences. This 
Article is an effort to not only acknowledge and grapple with the fact of 
private regulation but to contemplate the prospect of private regulation in an 
arena where it is likely to be quite powerful—the regulation of sex and 
sexuality. The very fact that much of sex and intimate life is considered 
private and individualized and viewed as appropriately beyond the state’s 
purview makes it especially susceptible to regulatory entreaties from private 
actors. 
 
 258 For a discussion on the role of social media and technology in modern social movements, see 
generally Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s Power to Transform Law, 105 KY. 
L.J. 413 (2016). The response to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shootings in Parkland, 
Florida, is exemplary of this trend. In February 2018, a former student at Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
High School shot and killed seventeen people at the school with an assault rifle. Patricia Mazzei, Parkland 
Gunman Carried Out Rampage Without Entering a Single Classroom, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/us/parkland-shooting-reconstruction.html [https://perma.cc/R48J-
6XH6]. In the aftermath of the shooting, Parkland students and parents began organizing for more 
rigorous gun control laws—indeed to “rewrite the entire national dialogue about school shootings.” Kelli 
Kennedy, Parkland Siblings Detail #NeverAgain Inception in New Book, SEATTLE TIMES (published June 
19, 2018, 3:28 PM; updated June 20, 2018, 8:09 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-
world/apxparkland-siblings-detail-neveragain-inception-in-new-book [https://perma.cc/VUM2-3GD2]; 
NEVER AGAIN, https://neveragain.org [https://perma.cc/AV48-EDJU]; see also Emily Witt, How the 
Survivors of Parkland Began the Never Again Movement, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-survivors-of-parkland-began-the-never-again-
movement [https://perma.cc/7LBA-2RFH]. This included social media campaigns aimed at engaging the 
state in enacting stricter gun control policies, while also pressuring private actors, like retail outlets, to 
subscribe to their gun-control agenda. Their efforts also included large-scale initiatives like the March for 
Our Lives, a gun-control demonstration organized by the students through social media that drew a crowd 
of 800,000 attendees. Katie Reilly, Here’s the Size of the March for Our Lives Crowd in Washington, 
TIME (Mar. 24, 2018), http://time.com/5214405/march-for-our-lives-attendance-crowd-size 
[https://perma.cc/U7GE-ZLP8]. When Laura Ingraham, a conservative television host, disparaged the 
group, its aims, and one of its leaders on-air, the leader quickly mobilized social media to successfully 
petition advertisers to rescind advertising support for Ingraham’s show. See David Hogg 
(@davidhogg111), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018, 1:08 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
davidhogg111/status/986335537568116737 [https://perma.cc/7MT3-UEDN] (calling for a boycott of 
Vanguard Group and BlackRock); see also Adam Gabbatt, NoRA: Activists and Stars Launch Gun 
Control Campaign to Battle NRA, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/21/resistance-now-nra-nora-gun-control-activism 
[https://perma.cc/8WMX-58N9] (discussing the development of the No Rifle Association Initiative, 
which included both celebrities and Parkland students as part of an NRA boycott). 
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As this Article suggests, private sexual regulation may take a variety of 
forms—some that seek to engage the state and others that enlist the state as 
a partner, however passively, in its regulatory efforts. Regardless of the form 
that this kind of regulation takes—and whether the substantive outcomes 
sought are normatively appealing to various audiences—the fact of these 
regulatory efforts demands greater attention and study. This Article is an 
invitation to do both. 
